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Item essentiality is currently determined in the U. S.
Navy using an integer valued Item Mission Essentiality Code
(IMEC) . Unfortunately, this ordinal coding scheme does not
provide a means of determining how much more important an
item with, say, an IMEC value of 4 is over an item with an
IMEC value of 1 . In addition, the Navy's wholesale level
inventory models have no way of using these code values in
determining spare and repair part inventory levels. An
essentiality parameter E does exist in these models but the
Navy has not developed a way to convert IMEC values into E
values. This thesis proposes four models for providing this
conversion. These models incorporate ideas obtained from
interviews with inventory management personnel at the Navy'
s
Inventory Control Points. Implementing one of these models
in conjunction with the other recommendations presented in
this thesis would result in stocking policies which better
relate to the operational effectiveness for items stocked by
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Current stocking levels for items within the Navy'
s
wholesale supply system are calculated by wholesale inventory
models. These models, developed in the late 1960's/early
1970' s, contain a factor for item essentiality that should
reflect the importance of each item in relation to its
subsequent system as a whole. Department of Defense (DOD)
inventory policies require the use of these item
essentialities in the determination of spare and repair part
inventories at both the wholesale and retail levels. [Ref.
l:p. 2] In this manner, the stocking level of each item is
(or should be) partly based on its essentiality to all
systems of which the item is a part or component. The
problem with this process is that, up to now, the
essentiality factor in these Navy wholesale models is given a
constant value for all items. The result is that the
stockage models ignore essentiality.
Each item in the Navy's wholesale system does receive an
essentiality measure known as an IMEC (Item Mission
Essentiality Code) . IMEC s range on a scale of 1 to 5 with 5
reflecting the highest essentiality. This IMEC is developed
from the combination of two additional codes: the MEC
(Military Essentiality Code); and the MCC (Mission
Criticality Code)
.
MEC's denote the essentiality of a part
to its applicable end item. [Ref. 2:p. 2-24] MEC's currently
can have values of 1, 3, 5, and 7, with 1 and 5 having the
highest essentiality. MCC's denote the criticality of an end
item to the overall mission of the system. [Ref. 2:p. 2-24]
MCC's range from 1 to 5, 5 being the most critical. All
combined, these three codes form a basis for an item's
essentiality. (Chapter II will discuss how these codes are
assigned in detail.)
Unfortunately, none of the essentiality codes just
mentioned actually reflect how much more essential one item
is over another. For example, is an item with an IMEC of 5
twice as essential as an item with an IMEC of 4, or is it 20
times more essential? Since this question currently cannot
be answered, the essentiality factor used in the Navy'
s
wholesale inventory levels-setting models is basically
ineffective. Instead, as mentioned above, the essentiality
factor in the Navy's wholesale models is set at a constant
value. Therefore, it does not adequately reflect
essentiality in the calculation of stocking levels.
B. THESIS OBJECTIVE
This thesis proposes four models for essentiality
weighting based on the three essentiality codes (MEC's,
MCC's, and IMEC's) that can be used in the wholesale
inventory models for determining stocking levels. These
models evolve from evaluating the management emphasis placed
on items with different essentiality codes at both the Ships
Parts Control Center (SPCC) and the Aviation Supply Office
(ASO) , and by studying the current procedures for assigning
the three essentiality codes. The implications of
implementing any of the models would be a stocking policy
which better relates to the operational effectiveness for
items stocked by the Navy's wholesale supply system.
C. SCOPE OF THESIS
This thesis is limited to the study of the current
procedures for assigning essentiality codes, and the
evaluation of management practices, policies, and opinions
with respect to essentiality codes at the Navy's Inventory
Control Points. It does not attempt to determine if the
assignment of the current essentiality codes is correct-.
D. PREVIEW OF SUBSEQUENT CHAPTERS
Chapter II will first provide more insight into the use
of the essentiality factor in the wholesale inventory models
and why this factor is important. It will then describe the
essentiality assignment process in detail for MEC's, MCC's,
and IMEC's. Finally, Chapter II will address the current
approach used at SPCC and ASO to weight stockage levels by
essentiality
.
Chapter III will present the four different essentiality
weighting models that have been proposed by the author and by
personnel interviewed at SPCC and ASO. It also discusses a
proposed method for implementation of these models.
Chapter IV will provide conclusions on the use of
essentiality codes/weights in the Navy's wholesale inventory
models, and will summarize some of the problems expected to
be encountered with their use. It will also provide
recommendations for improvements in essentiality weighted
inventory models and areas for further study.
The appendices provide copies of relevant DOD and Chief
of Naval Operations (OPNAV) instructions as well as excerpts
from tables used to compute various essentiality codes.
II. ESSENTIALITY ASSIGNMENT AND CURRENT MODEL
This chapter first provides a brief background and
example of where and how the essentiality factor fits in the
wholesale inventory models. It then discusses the
essentiality assignment process for MEC's, MCC's, and IMEC's.
Finally, this chapter presents the current approach used at
SPCC and ASO to calculate essentiality weighted stockage
levels
.
A. THE ESSENTIALITY FACTOR IN THE INVENTORY MODELS
To provide an example of where the essentiality factor
fits in the wholesale inventory models, consider the Navy's
Uniform Inventory Control Point (UICP) Consumables Inventory
Model. The objective of the consumable model is to determine
how much stock to buy and when, which will minimize the total
expected or average annual variable costs of ordering and
holding inventory, subject to a constraint on time-weighted,
essentiality-weighted requisitions short (backorders)
.
Mathematically, this is equivalent to:
Minimize TVC = OC + HC + BRS
where: TVC = Total average annual variable costs.
OC = Average annual variable order costs.
HC = Average annual variable holding costs
.
BRS = Time-weighted, essentiality-weighted
shortage (backorder) cost
.
fi = Shortage cost. (Most all Naval Supply
Systems Command (NAVSUP) publications use
the Greek letter lambda CX) as the symbol
for shortage cost. In this case, the Greek
letter beta (fi) is used because lambda was
not available as a character in the
software package used to type this thesis)
.
[Ref. 2:p. 3-A-3 & 4, and Ref. 3]
The term BRS is where the essentiality factor is applied.
Through various mathematical assumptions and procedures, ftRS
is expressed as the following:
CO
BRS = (fiE/SQ) J (x-R) [F (x+Q;L) -F (x;L) ] dx
R
i
where: fi>RS = Time-weighted, essentiality-weighted
average annual shortage costs for an item.
fi> = Time-weighted shortage cost for a
backordered requisition for an item.
E sb Essentiality factor for an item; currently
assumed to be between . and 1.0.
S = Average number of units per requisition
for an item.
Q = Economic reorder quantity for an item.
R = Reorder point for an item.
x = Number of units of the item demanded over
procurement leadtime.
L = Procurement leadtime for an item.
F(x;L) = Probability distribution function for
leadtime demand for an item.
[Ref. 2:p. 3-A-4 & 5, and Ref. 3]
Taking the partial derivative of the TVC equation with
respect to R, an expression for Risk, or the probability of a
stockout during L, is obtained:
Risk = P(x>R*) = (DIC) / (DIC+fiFE)
where: P (x>R ) = Probability that leadtime demand for
an item is greater than the optimal
*
reorder point (R ) for the item.
D = Average quarterly demand for an item.
I = Holding cost rate per year (constant = .23
for consumables)
.
C = Unit cost for an item.
F = Quarterly requisition frequency for an
item. [Ref. 2:p. 3-A-7, and Ref. 3]
Currently, the essentiality factor (E) in these equations
is a constant set equal to 0.5 for all SPCC managed items and
0.01 for all ASO managed items. Therefore, E is basically
ignored. In order for E to be utilized as it was meant to
be, each item should have an essentiality value that
discriminates how much more or less important it is relative
to other items
.
B. ESSENTIALITY CODE ASSIGNMENT PROCESS
This section describes the details of the assignment of
the three essentiality codes currently used in the Navy's
inventory system: Military Essentiality Codes (MEC's);
Mission Criticality Codes (MCC's); and Item Mission
Essentiality Codes (IMEC's).
1. Military Essentiality Codes (MEC's)
The assignment of MEC's is basically the same for
both SPCC and ASO. MEC's denote the essentiality of a part
to its applicable end item. From Appendix A, a Naval Supply
Systems Command (NAVSUP) letter with enclosures which
formally defines each MEC and explains the MEC assignment
procedures; in detail:
This code (MEC) indicates the degree to which
unavailability of a replacement for an installed item
when needed to perform corrective maintenance affects the
ability of the end item (e.g., radar set, fire control
system, electrical generator) to perform its primary
function in the intended manner. The need to perform
corrective maintenance is normally the result of failure
of an item and so essentiality is commonly evaluated in
the context of item failure, but it must be remembered
that some parts may be needed for replacement owing to
their use when replacing other failed parts (e.g.,
gaskets)
.
When MEC's were first developed, there were only
three categories: MEC 1, 3, and 5. MEC 1 meant the item was
essential to the end item. MEC 3 meant the item was not
essential to the end item. MEC 5 meant the item was
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essential to the end item due to safety reasons. As time
progressed, it became obvious that the vast majority of items
(up to 99%) were being coded as a MEC 1. [Ref. 4:p. 3]
Another problem was there was no standard in-depth
methodology published or implemented to actually assign
MEC's. Even one of the primary documents that was supposed
to be used for MEC assignments, MIL-STD-1388-2A, POD
Requirements for a Logistic Support Analysis Record (LSAR)
dated 20 July, 1984, was confusing and incomplete. It has
only one small section (less than a page) on MEC assignments.
As a result, the NAVSUP letter presented in Appendix
A was written. It is intended to amplify MIL-STD-1388-2A.
This letter explains in detail the definitions of MEC's and
the procedures for MEC assignment. As presented in MIL-STD-
1388-2A, it also provides for one additional MEC of 7 that
allowed for gradual deterioration of a part. MEC 7 provides
an alternative to assigning an MEC of 1 .
MEC's, according to Appendix A, are to be assigned in
the provisioning process by the contractor and the
appropriate - Hardware Systems Command (HSC) . The two major
HSC's are the Naval Air Systems Command (NAVAIR) and the
Naval Sea Systems Command (NAVSEA) . The MEC assignment is
based on the results of the Failure Modes, Effects, and
Criticality Analysis (FMECA, MIL-STD-1629A) . As Appendix A
states
:
Accordingly, this letter requests that the Navy Hardware
Systems Commands invoke the requirement for assignment of
MIL-STD-1388-2A Military Essentiality Codes (MEC's) of
reference (b) in accordance with the guidance contained
in enclosure (1) . These MEC assignments should be
included in the provisioning process for all systems
acquisitions for which a contract has not already been
awarded. Where a contract has already been awarded every
effort should be made to modify the contract to require
the more stringent enclosure (1) requirements.
For systems designed and produced prior to this
procedure, MEC's were similarly assigned but the procedure
was not as difficult due to only three MEC's being possible
for assignment. The MEC's for these systems will remain at
their currently assigned values as it would be to expensive
to attempt to change them. [Ref. 5]
Although the process explained in Appendix A is the
approved methodology for assigning MEC's, improvements
continue to be made. Although not yet approved, additional
MEC's have; been defined and a flow chart developed to improve
the assignment process. During the Readiness Based Sparing
(RBS) Experiment for DDG-52 (USS JOHN BARRY, second ship of
the new ARLEIGH BURKE class of DDG's), the Naval Sea (NAVSEA)
Logistics Center in Mechanicsburg, PA, further defined each
MEC as follows (see Appendix B, the actual Working Paper for
the RBS Experiment for DDG-52)
:
MEC 1: Failure of this part will immediately render
the end item inoperable
.
MEC 3: Failure of this part will not render the end
item inoperable since the function of this part
is not associated with a primary mission.
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MEC 5: Failure of this part will create an immediate
potential for the person operating or
maintaining the end item to risk injury or
death.
MEC 7: Failure of this part occurs gradually and the
degradation of performance is observable and
measurable and when fully failed will render
end item inoperable.
MEC 8: Failure of this part limits the capability of
the end item, since redundancy permits the end
item to continue to function but with reduced
capability
.
MEC 9: Failure of this part will not immediately
affect the performance of the end item nor will
failure immediately reduce the capability of
the end item because of redundant design or
alternatives
.
The definitions of MEC s 1, 3, 5, and 7 are basically
the same as in Appendix A but two additional MEC's, 8 and 9,
have been added. The issue behind the addition of these two
new MEC s was primarily redundancy at the item level. During
the RBS Experiment for DDG-52, it was discovered that there
really were two separate categories within MEC 3 and two
separate categories within MEC 7. MEC 3 and MEC 7 both
included the possibility of redundancy at the item level.
Rather than make two subcategories within each of these MEC's
(i.e., 3A and 3B, or 7A and 7B) , it was decided to separate
these categories into two new MEC's. As a result, MEC 8 was
split out from the original MEC 7, and MEC 9 was split out
from the original MEC 3. [Ref. 5]
The new order of MEC importance that includes the two
new MEC's, in descending order, is:
11
MEC 5, MEC 1, MEC 8, MEC 7, MEC 9, MEC 3
[Appendix B]
Another outgrowth of the RBS Experiment on DDG-52 was
the development of a flow chart to assist provisioners and
the HSC's in assigning these MEC's.
An in-depth explanation of these revised MEC's along
with the flow chart is given in Appendix B. Since this is
the most current explanation of MEC's, it forms the basis for
the development of the essentiality weighting models to be
presented in Chapter III.
There are two major problems in assigning MEC's.
First, the provisioners that are assigning MEC's must have an
intimate knowledge of the interactions of the parts and
components of the system. Otherwise, the entire MEC
assignment process will be faulty. Second, the minimum level
of acceptable performance must be defined for each system.
The provisioners need to know what is the fully functional
state of the system. This must be used as a baseline for MEC
assignment. [Ref. 5]
2. Mission Criticality Codes (MCC's)
MCC assignment is different for SPCC and ASO,
therefore each method will be addressed separately. In
addition, ASO has different definitions for its MCC's, which
range from 1 to 5, vice 1 to 4 as with SPCC.
MCC's denote the criticality of a system, equipment,
or component to the mission of the military unit in which the
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system, equipment, or component is installed. [Ref. 2:p. 2-
46]
a. Ships Parts Control Center (SPCC) MCC Assignment
Appendix C contains enclosures (2) through (5)
from Reference 1 which explain the current MCC assignment
process in detail for each different equipment/system
circumstance. MCC s for SPCC range from 1 to 4, 4 being the
most critical. There are three basic procedures used to
assign MCC's depending on where the system is in its life
cycle
.
The most common procedure utilizes data from the
maintenance history of a system. This procedure assigns
MCC's based on the Casualty Report (CASREP) history of
systems. A CASREP is a report from an operational unit to
higher authority informing them of an equipment related
i
problem that prevents the unit from performing one or all of
its missions. A C4 CASREP is the most severe, with C3, C2,
and CI CASREPs following in decreasing order of severity.
(An example of a C4 CASREP on a ship would be loss of a main
propulsion engine or steering gear while at sea.)
The MCC assignments made using this procedure are
as follows:
MCC 4: The ratio of C3 and C4 CASREPs to C2 CASREPs is
at least one to five, and the ratio of C4 to C3
CASREPs is at least one to three.
MCC 3: The ratio of C3 and C4 CASREPs to C2 CASREPs is
at least one to five, but the ratio of C4 to C3
CASREPs is less than one to three.
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MCC 2: The ratio of C3 and C4 CASREPs to C2 CASREPs is
less than one to five.
MCC 1: No CASREP history. [Ref. 2:p. 2-47]
A second procedure utilizes a file called the
Mission Criticality Code Matrix File (MCCMF) . "This file,
approved for development by NAVSEA in 20 November 1981,
currently exists for the majority of active fleet ships and
links Equipment Identification Code (EIC) to MCC to ship,
ship type and/or class." [Appendix C] This file is basically
a master historical MCC file that lists all known SPCC
managed systems by EIC and their resulting MCC s by ship
type. An example of this file is contained in Appendix D.
To obtain the MCC of a critical part from the MCCMF, simply
find the EIC or the EIC nomenclature for the system that the
part belongs to and assign the largest MCC in the row of
MCC's corresponding to that EIC. (The largest MCC in the row
is selected since a part can have only one MCC and the most
serious situation is the one that should be represented.)
[Refs. 5 and 6]
A third procedure is to use a matrix chart to
determine the MCC's. The matrix chart, developed by a Naval
Material Command (NAVMAT) Working Group and approved by the
Office of the Secretary of Defense in October, 1981, is based
on the system's number of alternate and/or redundant systems,
and the impact upon the overall mission if these alternatives
fail. Table 1 presents this chart. [Ref. l:encl. (1), p. 1]
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2 3 4 Severe degradation
of mobility or
total loss of a
i primary mission..12 3 Severe degradation
of a primary mission.112 Total loss or severe
degradation of a
secondary mission.Ill Minor mission impact.
[Ref. l:encl. (1) p. 1]
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When MCC s were first developed, every system in
the Navy's inventory required their assignment. The CASREP
ratios, based on historical CASREP data, were provided to
facilitate MCC assignment for all of the Navy' s systems that
had been operating for over three or four years. Obviously,
this method is dependent upon the accuracy of the CASREP
reporting system. Also there is no time limit on measuring
the CASREP ratios for MCC's. Therefore, MCC's assigned using
this method are "life-cycle" MCC's (i.e., all maintenance
history available is utilized) . [Refs. 5 and 6]
For relatively newer systems or systems that are
undergoing configuration changes, alterations, or equipment
changes, the MCCMF procedure is used when possible. All
systems that fit in these categories are screened against the
MCCMF to determine if an MCC already exists that can be
assigned. If so, this is the MCC that is assigned. For
example, if an updated circuit board was installed in the
AN/SLQ-32 (V) 3 countermeasures set (EIC N87K) , from Appendix
D, the new MCC for that circuit board would be 4, the largest
MCC in that particular EIC's row.
For new construction and major conversion
systems, neither the MCCMF nor the CASREP ratios can be
utilized. Therefore, using contractor data, maintenance and
repair analysis data, and reliability block diagram data
(showing redundancy and alternative systems) , the matrix
chart shown in Table 1 is utilized to assign MCC's.
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Basically, if an item is on a reliability block diagram, then
it may be critical and can be an MCC 1, 2, 3, or 4 . If it is
not on a reliability block diagram, it is not critical and is
limited to an MCC of 1 or 2. The ship's/unit's mission is
then considered along with redundancy and alternatives (and
the sufficiency of the redundancy and alternatives) and an
MCC is selected from the MCC matrix chart. [Refs. 5 and 6]
One problem that became apparent during this
study is that a final step in the MCC assignment process
should be to verify the current MCC's assigned periodically
using the historical CASREP data and their related ratios.
To date, only about 50% of the items managed by SPCC have
been verified. However, the NAVSEA Logistics Center in
Mechanicsburg has one person totally dedicated to MCC
verification and the process is continuing at SPCC. [Ref. 5]
b. Aviation Supply Office (ASO) MCC Assignment
The MCC assignment process at ASO is different
from SPCC's process. The main reason for the difference is
explained by the way that systems, specifically weapons
systems, are defined. At SPCC a system could be defined as
any major component of a larger system, with a large number
of systems onboard a ship or unit. At ASO the system is
basically defined as the aircraft itself, made up of many
different components. This is a simplistic view of the




MCC's were developed for ASO on contract by the
Naval Air Development Center (NADC) in Warminster,
Pennsylvania. MCC's for ASO range from 1 to 5 with 5 being
the most critical. The approved definitions for these five
MCC's are:
MCC Definition
5 Not safely flyable/Not Mission Capable (NMC)
.
4 Severe degradation of mission capability.
3 Not capable of performing all assigned missions
but can perform at least one mission.
2 Full Mission Capable (FMC)
.
1 Optimum Performance Capability (OPC)
.
[Ref. 2:p. 2-39]
There are basically two procedures for assigning
MCC's at ASO. Both methods utilize these same definitions
and explanations. The use of a particular method depends on
where the aircraft is in its life cycle (the same philosophy
as SPCC's different methods),
,
The first procedure is used to assign MCC's to
established systems (systems that have been in service for a
number of years) and have an established maintenance record.
It utilizes the 3-M Maintenance Data Collection System (MDCS)
and the VIDS/MAF (Visual Identification Display
System/Maintenance Action Form, OPNAV 4790/60) to obtain
Equipment Operation Capability (EOC) codes on failed
equipment. [Ref. 7]
EOC codes indicate the impact of a
failure/removal of a subsystem or part on the mission of the
aircraft. The procedures for assigning EOC codes are
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contained in Reference 8, OPNAVINST 5442. 4L, commonly called
the MESM (Mission-Essential Subsystems Matrices) . From
OPNAVINST 5442. 4L [Ref. 8:p. 2]:
EOC codes relate a particular system/subsystem within a
Type/Model/Series of equipment (aircraft) to a specific
mission. EOC codes have three positions. The first
position is an alpha character which describes mission
capability. The last two positions are the first two
numeric characters of the Work Unit Code (WUC) which
identify the system/subsystem impairing mission
capability. [Ref. 8:p. 2]
Basically, each system installed on an aircraft
is given an EOC code that indicates its effect on the mission
of the aircraft if that system fails. The MESM provides an
EOC code for each piece of equipment on an aircraft. An
example of how the MESM works to assign an EOC code is
contained in Appendix E, an excerpt from the MESM for the
F/A-18 Hornet aircraft. From Appendix E, if the radar liquid
cooling system is inoperative, an EOC code (alpha character)
of J is assigned.
The VIDS/MAF form, while primarily used as a
maintenance action document, also relates NSN' s (National
Stock Numbers) or part numbers to EOC codes for the purposes
of MCC assignment. Appendix F is a copy of a VIDS/MAF form.
Block 19 contains the part number (or NSN) and blocks B16 and
B27 contain the EOC code that is assigned by the MESM to the
equipment as a result of its failure. This relates the part
number to this EOC code. [Ref. 7 and 9]
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Each part now has an EOC code assigned to it for
that particular aircraft. However, since a part may be
utilized on several different aircraft, it is possible for
that one part to have several different EOC codes assigned to
it. Therefore, it is necessary to condense these different
codes into one overall EOC code for each part. This is done
by utilizing a frequency distribution developed by NADC
.
This distribution assigns a relative weight to each EOC code
assigned to a part, and then produces one general overall EOC
code that is assigned to the one part number. [Ref. 7]
For example, from Appendix E the magnetic compass
on the F/A-18A/B is assigned an EOC code of B. A component
part in this magnetic compass would also have an EOC code of
B. However, this same part may be used in another magnetic
compass on a different aircraft and be assigned an EOC code
of C. The frequency distribution may weight the EOC code of
B with .8 and the EOC code of C with .2 for that particular
part. The resulting part's overall EOC code would then be B.
At this point, each part number has one
particular EOC code assigned to it. The MCC can now be
easily determined from the following chart contained in
Reference 2:
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EOC Readiness Category MCC Assigned
Z Not Mission Capable (NMC) /Not Safely 5
Flyable
J-L Partial Mission Capable (severe) 4
C-H Partial Mission Capable (PMC) 3
B Full Mission Capable (FMC) 2
A Optimum Performance Capability (OPC) 1
[Ref. 2:p. 2-40]
The second method used to assign MCC's, which has
just recently been formalized by NADC, is for systems that
are new and have no or at least very little maintenance data
history available. This procedure utilizes engineering
design data taken from Failure Modes, Effects, and
Criticality Analysis (FMECA, MIL-STD-1629A) , Logistic Support
Analysis Record (LSAR, MIL-STD-1388-2A) , and the Maintenance
Plan Analysis (MPA) for Aircraft and Ground Equipment (MIL-
STD-2080AS) . [Ref. 7] This data is used to determine the
rules for:
- Mission Phase Code (MPC) : Identifies the mission
phase/operational mode in which a failure occurs.
- Safety Hazard Severity Code (SHSC) : Identifies worst
potential consequences of item failure in four
categories: catastrophic (SHSC=1), critical
(SHSC=2), marginal (SHSC=3) , and minor (SHSC=4).
- Failure Mode Criticality Number (Cm ) : Criticality
number for a specific failure mode within an SHSC
category and MPC.
- Item Criticality Number (C ) : Number of system
failures of a specific type expected due to the
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item's failure modes. It is the sum of the C values
for each combination of SHSC and MPC for the item.
[Ref. 7]
The MCC for a new system is a function of MPC,
SHSC, C , C , the maintenance concept, maintainability, and
comparative logistic delays. Without going into too much
detail, MCC s are assigned based on the SHSC having the
greatest C weighted by estimated downtimes (downtime being
defined as the total time the system is not functioning due
to a failure, including supply, logistics and administrative
time delays) . For example, if a system had three C 's of 10,
20, and 30 failures each weighted by a downtime of 10 hours,
then the C ' s weighted by downtimes for this system would be
100, 200, and 300 failure-hours. Then, if these three C ' s
of 100, 200, and 300 failure-hours had corresponding SHSC
values of 4, 3, and 2, respectively, then the greatest C
weighted by downtimes is 300 failure-hours which corresponds
to an SHSC value of 2 . An SHSC value of 2 crosses to an MCC






This chart was developed by NADC and purposely skips an MCC
of 2 due to not enough differences between the definitions of
SHSC's 3 and 4 to include another code. [Ref. 7]
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One problem with the MCC assignments for ASO is
that this assignment process was done only once in 1986-87 on
contract by NADC . Current plans are to bring the assignment
of aviation MCC's under the control of ASO' s Uniform
Inventory Control Point (UICP) program through
resystemization [Ref . 10] . Briefly, resystemization is the
Naval Supply Systems Command' s current effort to upgrade the
computer hardware and software systems used by the Inventory
Control Points (ICP's). However, in the interim, there are
no apparent plans to continue to assign MCC's or check MCC
assignments, even though the process has been established and
is required by the Logistic Support Analysis Record (LSAR,
MIL-STD-1388-2A) . The main reason for this is lack of
funding. Because of this it is unsure what will happen to
new system's MCC assignments during this resystemization
development period. [Refs. 7 and 9] One possible solution
would be to require the contractor to assign MCC s during the
provisioning process just as MEC's are assigned. These
preliminary MCC's would be based on preliminary support data
such as FMECA and the LSAR. [Ref. 3]
3. Item Mission Essentiality Codes (IMEC's)
IMEC's are assigned from a combination of both MEC's
and MCC's. This is true for both SPCC and ASO. IMEC's range
from 1 to 4 (5 for ASO) , 4 being the most essential (5 for
ASO)
.
The approved definitions for IMEC's are:
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IMEC SPCC Definition ASO Definition
5 N/A NMC/Not Safely Flyable.
4 Loss of a primary PMC/Loss of at least
mission capability. one primary mission.
3 Severe degradation PMC/Degradation of a
of a primary mission primary mission.
capability
.
2 Loss of a secondary FMC/Loss of a secondary
mission capability. mission.
1 Minor mission impact. OPC/Capable of all
[Ref. 2:p. 2-47] missions. [Ref. 7]
The ASO definitions are very similar to the MCC
definitions. The reason for this will be discussed later.
The assignment process is very simple and, in fact,
most all IMEC's are computer assigned. Table 2, taken from
Appendix A, specifies the IMEC assignment for each
combination of MEC and MCC:











7 4 or 5 3
3 1,2,3, 4, or 5 1
5 1,2,3, 4, or 5 5
Although there are several documents, including
Reference 2, that provide equivalent information in different
formats, this table is the most current. The other tables
are older and do not include the addition of MEC 7. One will
also notice MEC's 8 and 9 are not included in Table 2. This
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is because MEC's 8 and 9 are too new and as yet have not been
officially recognized.
An interesting aspect of Table 2 is that MEC's have
very little influence on the assignment of the IMEC. Another
fact which supports this is that, as previously mentioned for
ASO, the definitions for MCC's and IMEC's are very similar.
It is unclear why this is true. Apparently, the MEC
assignment process is not trusted and is not regarded as
accurate by many at the ICP's because most, if not all, of
the MEC's come from the contractor and the Navy does not have
much control over that part of the assignment process. In
addition, the assignment of MEC's is not as clear-cut as the
assignment of MCC's. MEC's are based on preliminary
information provided in the provisioning process whereas the
predominance of MCC assignments come from actual
casualty/maintenance information (CASREP information for SPCC
and VIDS/MAF EOC information for ASO)
.
One final note on IMEC's and MCC's is that both SPCC
and ASO may assign MCC's and IMEC's of to new items. This
code basically means that an MCC or IMEC has not been
assigned yet. This becomes a serious problem when, after 18
to 24 months of operational use, the inventory management of
the item transitions to the wholesale replenishment model and
safety levels are calculated. For an item with an MCC and
IMEC of in the wholesale replenishment model, the result is
that no safety level is provided. This can cause excessive
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numbers of shortages and backorders of critically needed
parts with resulting decreases in the operational
effectiveness for new weapons systems. The extent of this
problem can be seen at ASO, where apparently 30% of their
items have MCC's and IMEC's of 0. Almost all of these items
are new. [Ref. 9] Coupled with the fact that it usually
takes a long time (in excess of two years in some cases) to
assign accurate MCC's and IMEC's, and the lack of funding at
ASO that prevents future MCC assignment, this is a serious
problem that needs to be addressed. [Refs. 6 and 9]
As mentioned at the end of section 2b, one way to
solve this problem would be to require the contractor to
assign an initial MCC just as they are now required to assign
an MEC . This would allow the item to be assigned an initial
IMEC, and would also insure an initial safety level from the
wholesale replenishment model. Two or three years later,
this initial MCC could be validated using current CASREP or
VIDS/MAF information and changed if necessary. [Ref. 3]
C. ACTUAL ICP ESSENTIALITY WEIGHTING PROCEDURE
The current approach for weighting inventory levels-
setting by essentiality is explained in Appendices G, H, and
I. Appendix G, with enclosures, contains the Naval Supply
Systems Command's (NAVSUP) request for approval of the
procedure from the Chief of Naval Operations (CNO) . Appendix
H is CNO's approval. Appendix I is SPCC's 1990 Program
26
Operations Memorandum (POM) Spare Parts Initiative budget
submission which attempts to identify the additional funding
required to implement SPCC's portion of the procedure.
This approach is based on relating IMEC's and System
Material Availability (SMA) . SMA is a customer service
measure for the wholesale inventory system and is defined as
the percent of requisitions which are satisfied on the first
pass from stock on hand in the wholesale system [Ref. 2:p. 1-
19] . The current overall Navy goal for SMA is 85% without
regard to IMEC.
The approach takes this overall goal of 85% and increases
it for higher IMEC items. As shown in Appendices G and I,






What this process basically does is increase the SMA goal as
IMEC increases and, as a result, increase the level of safety
stock.
One important advantage of this approach is that it is
easy to understand and implement. As Appendix G states:
Several alternative methods were evaluated. However, the
alternative of varying SMA goals by IMEC category was
selected based upon both the ease of understanding and
the relative ease of computer program modifications
necessary for implementation.
The one major problem with this approach is that a one-






indicates, the procedure has been approved contingent upon
funding available to buy the increases in inventory levels
resulting from the increases in SMA. As Appendix I
indicates, the additional funding required is over $200
million just for IMEC 3 and 4 items. Appendix H also states
that funding will be provided when the lowest essentiality
items achieve an SMA of 85%. What this means is that funding
will be available when the Navy achieves this 85% goal for
all IMEC 1 items. For all practical purposes, that is an
impossibility in the near future. Thus, although this
approach will remain approved, it is doubtful if it will ever
be implemented. [Refs. 6 and 9]
To understand how these SMA goals would be achieved by
the Navy's wholesale replenishment model, Section A at the
beginning of this chapter needs to be reconsidered. There,
l
Risk was defined as the probability of a stockout and is used
to determine the reorder point and the safety stock. At
optimality, Risk is expressed as:
Risk = (DIC) / (DIC+BFE)
,
where 15 is the time-weighted shortage cost for the
backordered item and E is the essentiality factor for the
item, currently set as a constant (.5 for SPCC and .01 for
ASO) . All the other values (D, I, C, and F) are known
constants for any given item. The only parameter that is
virtually impossible to quantify is fl since it is impossible
to determine the cost of not having a part during wartime.
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Instead, fi is used as a "knob" for setting the item' s reorder
point so that the expected number of backordered requisitions
does not exceed 15% annually.
Since 85% SMA is the goal, it is input into a program
called CARES (Computation and Research Evaluation System)
.
The CARES program was developed by the Navy Fleet Material
Support Office (FMSO, Code 93) and it is run by SPCC, ASO,
and FMSO to evaluate the impact of different parameters on
the inventory levels-setting models. Five values of ft are
also input into CARES. For each ft, the program calculates a
reorder point and the expected number of backorder
requisitions that would occur during a year. A "plot" of SMA
as a function of ft is developed and from it the ft value for
an 85% SMA is determined.
Although ft is used to adjust the reorder point to achieve
the SMA goal, it really doesn't matter if ft was set constant
and E was varied to attain the goal. A part that is more
essential should have a higher E value and thus a higher
reorder point. [Ref. 3]
In practice, SPCC sets the shortage cost parameter ft for
a new item at a base value equal to the shortage cost of an
IMEC item within that particular cog for an initial period
of time equal to a procurement leadtime (PCLT) plus six to
eight months or until normal demand is experienced (i.e.,
PCLT plus a settling period) . This period of time could be
two to three years. At this point, the shortage costs (ft)
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are updated if needed through the CARES program. The last
update of shortage costs for SPCC done for this reason was in
1983 and an update is currently in progress. Approximately
two full PCLT" s have passed since the 1983 update and this
has given the demand and SMA values ample time to settle out.
[Ref. 6]
Updates are also done if funding levels change. For
example, if funding was only provided for a goal of 82% SMA,
the shortage costs would have to be reduced. [Ref. 6]
For ASO, the shortage costs (B) are reviewed twice per
year. One other difference at ASO is that ft is set by weapon
system (type of aircraft) and does not vary by item within
that weapon system. [Ref. 9]
A final comment with regard to the current essentiality
approach used by SPCC and ASO concerns how this process
affects the inventory managers at SPCC and ASO. The
inventory managers at both SPCC and ASO do not manage parts
by IMEC's, MEC's, or MCC's. They do, however, manage parts
by some form of essentiality and criticality, but it is based
primarily on experience with the parts and intuition. In
other words, they manage parts by problem areas (the "squeaky
wheel gets the grease") rather that by formally assigned
essentiality codes. [Ref. 11]
In SPCC's case, it is unclear why the codes are not used.
Possible explanations could be that the codes may not be
trusted or it is felt they are really not needed. However,
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the most likely explanation for not using the essentiality
codes is because the inventory managers probably don't know
how to use them. The inventory managers do have access to
IMEC codes on their data base as they are part of the four-
digit cog coding system. The four-digit cog is composed of
the standard two-digit cog symbol, the IMEC, and an alpha
character representing a category of requisition frequency.
In fact, the reason for the development of the four-digit cog
coding system was to assist the inventory managers in
managing their systems by IMEC. But the problem remains that
no one can tell the inventory manager how much more important
an IMEC of 4 is over an IMEC of 3 or 2 or 1 and, therefore,
the inventory manager cannot correctly use the IMEC as a
management tool. As a result, IMEC's are not currently used
explicitly in the inventory management of items, even though
the present system allows for their use.
At ASO the inventory managers do not even have visibility
of IMEC's, MEC's, and MCC's on their data base. This is
because the four digit cogs at ASO are composed of the
standard two-digit cog, and the two-digit SMIC (Special
Material Identification Code) for each system. Since IMEC's
are not a part of this four digit cog and SMIC's have no
essentiality meaning associated with them, if an inventory
manager at ASO wanted to manage an item by essentiality it
would be difficult to do so. He or she would have to
manually look up the codes for each part. [Ref. 9]
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III. PROPOSED ESSENTIALITY WEIGHTED MODELS
This chapter presents four models that weight the
essentiality of an item based on its MEC, MCC, and/or IMEC in
order to establish a means of quantitatively determining how
much more important one IMEC is over another. These weighted
values can then be use as the essentiality parameter E in the
Risk formula for the current ICP inventory models . The end
results are that two of the models are linear, meaning that
the relationship between the weighted values is a linear
function of the IMEC's; and two are non-linear, meaning that
the relationship between the weighted values is not a linear
function of the IMEC's.
The first model will be called the basic linear model.
It is developed using subjective values for MEC's and MCC's
which are then combined to obtain values for each IMEC
category. The second and third models are variations of the
basic linear model weighted by requisition frequency and ship
type, respectively. These models are based on suggestions
for improvements on the basic linear model which were
obtained during interviews with personnel at both SPCC and
ASO. The second model (basic linear model weighted by
requisition frequency) is non-linear and the third model
(basic linear model weighted by ship type) is linear. The
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last model is a non-linear model proposed by personnel at ASO
and is called the IMEC model.
A. BASIC LINEAR MODEL
This basic linear model is based on the assignment of
subjective values to the different levels of MEC's and MCC's
using their respective definitions. The subjective values
assigned are between 0.0 and 1.0 which is the assumed range
of the essentiality parameter E in the inventory levels-
setting formulas.
The first step in this model's development is to assign
subjective values to MEC's. The following detailed
definitions of MEC s are taken from Appendix B, the NAVSEA
Logistics Center Working Paper that was created as part of
the RBS Experiment for DDG-52 . The subjective values were
assigned by comparing the definition of each MEC with the
definition of the next lower MEC and determining a relative
decrease over the value of the higher MEC's subjective value
based on this comparison. As an example, MEC 5 was assigned
the highest subjective value of 1.0. Comparing the
definition of MEC 5 with the definition of the next lower
MEC, MEC 1, the difference is basically that MEC 5 is life-
threatening and MEC 1 is loss of a major system. It was
subjectively determined that loss of a major system was 15
per cent less essential than the loss of a life, therefore
MEC 1 was assigned a subjective value of 0.85. The MEC's are
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listed below in descending order of importance and the
subjective value assigned to each MEC follows its definition.
MEC 5: An MEC 5 will be assigned to an item which
meets all of the following conditions:
- Its failure, when it is expected to be functioning,
will subject a person operating or maintaining the
end item to an immediate risk of death or injury.
- Any risk will not be dependent on the occurrence of
some second event following the failure of the part
being examined, but will be created solely by its
failure
.
- The failure must be immediately detectable making the
availability of a spare critical to safe resumption
of operations or maintenance.
Subjective value assigned: 1.0
MEC 1: An MEC 1 will be assigned when the most severe
failure mode disables at .least one of the end item' s
primary functions.
Subjective value assigned: 0.85
MEC 8: An MEC 8 will be assigned to an item which is
associated with designed redundancy or alternatives
.
Ordinarily, the failure of the item would disable the
end item in at least one of its primary functions,
however, because of the redundant design, the end
item is still capable of performing but at reduced
capacity. The intent of the MEC 8 is to provide a
recognition of the redundancy and to respect the
design integrity. An additional condition is that
the failure must be within normal maintenance
capability
.
Subjective value assigned: 0.5
MEC 7: An MEC 7 will be assigned to an item which
meets all of the following conditions:
- The item is not associated with redundancy.
- Its primary failure modes are not sudden, but gradual
in nature as deterioration or reduced functioning
over time
.
- Its deterioration or reduced performance is
detectable as it is occurring, allowing for the
ordering and receipt of a replacement part prior to
the installed unit deteriorating to the point that
its performance is no longer acceptable.
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- The rate of deterioration is such that normal, direct
turnover supply response times will allow a
requisitioned part to be received prior to total
failure
.
- At its final, fully deteriorated state, it will
disable the end item in at least one of its primary
functions
.
Subjective value assigned: 0.4
MEC 9: An MEC 9 is also associated with redundancy,
however, the assignment of the MEC 9 will be
based upon all of the following:
- The failure of the item will not immediately diminish
any capability or performance applicable to a primary
function of the end item.
- The failure is recognizable at the instant it occurs.
- The failure mode is independent and will not lead to
a series of secondary failures.
Subjective value assigned: 0.133
MEC 3: An MEC 3 will be assigned to an item whose
failure does not impair any primary function since
the function of this part is not associated with any
primary function. However, the failure will result
in an unscheduled maintenance action.
Subjective value assigned: 0.05










Next, MCC's are assigned subjective values. The MCC
matrix chart shown as Table 1 in Chapter II, Section B.2.a,
is the basis for assigning these subjective values. This
matrix was taken from Reference 1, enclosure (1), page 1, and
is one of the methods used to assign MCC's. The following
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subjective values for MCC's were assigned based on the
definitions in the matrix:
MCC Subjective Value




Now, essentiality values for each IMEC are calculated and
assigned based on particular combinations of the subjective
values for MEC's and MCC's. To obtain each IMEC essentiality
value, the subjective values for the MEC's and MCC's related
to that particular IMEC are multiplied together. The
following chart provides the resulting relative weight for
each current IMEC essentiality value. The basis for this
chart is taken from the table listed in enclosure (2) of
Appendix A.
MEC MCC IMEC
Subjective Subjective Resulting Subject
MEC Value MCC Value IMEC Value
1 0.85 1 0.05 1 .0425
1 0.85 2 0.20 2 .1700
1 0.85 3 0.80 3 .6800
1 0.85 4 1.00 4 .8500
1 0.85 5 1.00 5 .8500
7 0.40 1 0.05 1 .0200
7 0.40 2 0.20 1 .0800
7 0.40 3 0.80 2 .3200
7 0.40 4 or 5 1.00 3 .4000
3 0.05 1-5 MEC Overri de 1 .0500
5 1.00 1-5 MEC Overri de 5 1.0000
Although this chart does not currently include MEC's 8
and 9 because these two MEC's are relatively new, it could
easily be adapted to accept them. Also, by "MEC Override" is
meant that since the MCC can be assigned any of the values 1
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through 5, the MEC is the "overriding" factor and hence the
MCC subjective value does not matter. (It is equivalent to
setting the MCC subjective value to 1.0.)
As mentioned previously in this thesis, MEC's currently
have little influence on the assignment of IMEC's. However
in this model, MEC's are treated with equal importance as
MCC's; i.e., this model assumes that MEC's are accurate and
assigned properly.
This chart is now condensed into ranges for each IMEC
value based on the values in the last column above. The
final IMEC essentiality weight or value is assumed to be the
highest value in that particular IMEC's range. The following




IMEC Value Ranges Essentiality Value
1 0.00 - 0.08 0.08
2 0.09 - 0.32 0.32
3 0.33 - 0.68 0.68
4 or 5 0.69-1.00 1 .00
The IMEC essentiality values given in the above chart are
now in a form which can be used as the essentiality parameter
E in the current inventory levels-setting models.
Figure 1 on page 48 contains a plot of these IMEC values
which shows an approximate linear behavior for this model.
This function could be mathematically expressed as the
equation E=a(IMEC)+b where E is the essentiality factor in
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the Risk equation, a is the slope of the line, and b is the
y-intercept of the line.
A point made during Reference 6 which would change this
model slightly is that MEC's 5 and 1 are often considered
equal as far as essentiality is concerned, rather that MEC 5
(risk of personnel injury) taking priority over MEC 1 (loss
of a major system) . However, since operating personnel are a
vital element of a system it can also be argued that the
value of a life in this model has been regarded as more
essential than the loss of a major system. The rational of
Reference 6 suggests that in a wartime scenario the loss of a
major system could mean the loss of many lives. Therefore,
these two MEC's should be considered equal. As far as the
model is concerned, the difference would be in assigning a
subjective value of 1.0 to MEC l's vice a subjective value of
0.85. The IMEC range and final value would then change
slightly
.
Before considering the next model, it is appropriate to
note that a very simple linear model could be constructed
which would pass through the graph' s origin and would result
in an IMEC 2 being twice as important as an IMEC 1, an IMEC 3
being three times as important as an IMEC 1, and an IMEC 4
being four times as important as an IMEC 1. This, however,
is not believed to be the case because in the examination of
the development of IMEC's, MCC's, and MEC's, no one believes,
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for example, that an IMEC 4 is four times more important than
an IMEC 1. [Ref. 3]
B. BASIC LINEAR MODEL WEIGHTED BY REQUISITION FREQUENCY
This model was proposed during Reference 6. The
reasoning behind weighting IMEC essentiality values by
requisition frequency lies with the fact that, in certain
cases, several IMEC 2 items in a combined system sense can
cause more downtime than one IMEC 4. In this respect, an
estimate of number of requisitions (frequency) should be a
factor in essentiality weights. [Ref. 6]
This model picks up whe::e the basic linear model left
off. The IMEC essentiality values from the basic linear
model were:
IMEC IMEC E Values




Taking these IMEC E values and weighting them by an
average of one year sample of requisition frequencies from
SPCC for the period June, 1987 to June, 1988, for 1H cogs
results in the following [Ref. 6]
:
Reqn. Freq. New IMEC Normalized
IMEC IMEC E Value for IMEC E Value IMEC E Value
4 or 5 1.00 0.37 0.3700 1.0000
3 0.68 0.24 0.1632 0.4411
2 0.32 0.09 0.0288 0.0778
1 0.08 0.12 0.0096 0.0259
N/A 0.18 N/A N/A
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In this chart the IMEC = has been added. As was noted
in Chapter II, it is being used by the ICP's to indicate a
new system for which no permanent IMEC has been assigned yet.
Its inclusion is important since the percentage of
requisitions that occur for items with an IMEC of is
substantial (18%) .
Again, Figure 1 on page 48 shows a plot of these IMEC
weights or essentiality values. That plot emphasizes the
non-linearity of this model.
One initial problem that can be seen with this model is
that it seems to weight the shortage cost part of the Risk
formula with requisition frequencies twice. From Chapter II,
Section A, the Risk formula was Risk=DIC/ (DIC+ibFE) . The BFE
term already contains a factor for requisition frequency, F.
So the creation of an E value which includes requisition
frequency could be double counting F. However, the intent of
this model is to provide a relative weight for the
essentiality factor E based on IMEC values weighted by
requisition frequency rather than weighting the shortage cost
factor by requisition frequencies twice. In this context,
the requisition frequencies used to weight the IMEC values
would be an average over a long period of time (two or three
years) whereas the requisition frequency values used as F
would be quarterly values. The reason for using an average
of requisition frequencies for weighting the IMEC values is
because the inventory models must remain constant,
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consistent, and valid for long periods of time to prevent an
excessive amount of inventory churn (adds and deletes)
.
In comparing this model's tabled IMEC essentiality values
with those of the basic linear model, this model shows large
changes between IMEC 4's and 3's (from 1.000 down to 0.4411),
and between IMEC 3's and 2's (from 0.4411 down to 0.0778)
whereas the basic linear model is much less dramatic.
C. BASIC LINEAR MODEL WEIGHTED BY SHIP TYPE
This model was proposed during Reference 5. The
reasoning behind this model is that the basic linear model
assumes that the weight of an IMEC 4 on an aircraft carrier
is the same weight as an IMEC 4 on a tug boat. Although
this, in an extremely rare case, could possibly be true, as a
general rule it is not. An IMEC 4 on an aircraft carrier
should be' weighted more than an IMEC 4 on a less critical
ship. [Ref. 5]
Again, this model begins where the basic linear model
left off. First, a subjective weighting scheme for ship type
is devised. This weighting scheme was created by first
assigning a weight of 1.00 to all ship types whose primary
mission is directly combat related (Major Frontline
Combatants)
.
Next, a proportionately lower weight was
selected for those ship types that directly support these
combatants (First Line Support Ships) . Lastly,
41
proportionately lower weights were assigned to the Second
Line Support Ships and All Others ship type categories.
Subjective
Ship Type Weight




First Line Support Ships 0.80
(Combat Logistics Force ships,
LKA's, etc.)
Second Line Support Ships 0.50
(tenders, repair and salvage
ships)
All Other Ships 0.30
Taking the basic linear model's IMEC essentiality values
and weighting each one by these ship type weights results in
a new set of IMEC essentiality values for each ship type
category. Table 3 on the following page lists these new IMEC
essentiality values by ship type category. (Note that if an
item is common to several different ship types, the highest
IMEC essentiality value would be used as the item's IMEC
weight. For items that are non-common, the single ship type
category IMEC essentiality value is used.)
As with the previous two models and for purposes of
comparison, the first two categories of IMEC essentiality
values (those pertaining to the Major Frontline Combatants
and the First Line Support Ships ship type categories) are
plotted in Figure 1 on page 48. Of course, the plot for the
Major Frontline Combatants ship type category is identical to
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type category shows a linear model with a lower slope than
that of the Major Combatants.
The major problem with this model is it is somewhat
complicated and would be cumbersome to implement. It
increases the number of IMEC essentiality values used from
four to 16.
The point was made in Appendix G that conceptual
simplicity must be kept in mind. The ease of understanding
and the ease of making computer program modifications are
important factors to consider. In this case, these factors
may tend to override the benefits gained in using this model.
Another problem with this model is that it is not
designed to be used by ASO because it only considers ships.
The next model, however, as with the first two models, is
universal and can be used by both SPCC and ASO.
D. IMEC2 MODEL
This model was proposed during Reference 9. Although it
is a rather simple model, it is an interesting concept and
one which should not be discounted. It starts with IMEC 1 as
a baseline IMEC essentiality value and then says: an IMEC 2
is four times (2 ) as important as an IMEC 1; an IMEC 3 is
o
nine times (3 ) as important as an IMEC 1; and IMEC's 4 and 5
o
are 16 times (4^) as important as an IMEC 1. The following













Note that in this model, IMEC's 4 and 5 are treated
equally. The reason for this is that frequently IMEC's 4 and
5 are viewed as the same at ASO and, for simplicity, it was
decided not to split out IMEC 5 and make it 25 times more
important than an IMEC 4. [Ref. 9]
The baseline IMEC essentiality value in the above model
was selected to be ASO' s current value for E which is .01.
Since E is assumed to be between and 1, SPCC's value of .5
would not work. The baseline, in reality, doesn't really
matter as long as IMEC's 4 and 5 do not exceed the assumed
limit of 1.00 as their IMEC weight and that the shortage cost
parameter,, ft, is adjusted for the new baseline so that the
product BE remains unchanged.
Another variation of this model would be to set IMEC's 4
and 5 as the baseline at an IMEC essentiality value of 1.00
and vary IMEC's 1 through 3:
IMEC
IMEC IMEC 2 E Value




Again, for purposes of comparison, these IMEC
essentiality values are plotted on Figure 1 on page 48. This
second variation of the IMEC model was chosen for comparison
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in Figure 1 because of the IMEC 4/5 weight being equal to 1.0
for the first two models plotted in Figure 1.
It is interesting to note that this model falls between
the basic linear model and the non-linear, basic linear model
weighted by requisition frequency.
The advantage of this model is its simplicity and ease of
understanding, as it uses only IMEC values in its computation
of essentiality values. It also would be quite flexible,
being able to vary the scaling factor as needed.
E. MODEL IMPLEMENTATION
One universal problem constraining the implementation of
any of these proposed models is the availability of funding.
Just as with the current proposed changes to SMA' s associated
with IMEC values described in Chapter II, Section C, these
models would require additional funding to implement.
One can very easily see the relative effect these models
would have on increased inventory levels and increased
funding requirements. Currently E is set constant at .5 for
SPCC and .01 for ASO . Simply raising IMEC 4'S and 5's to an
E value of 1.00, which is a possibility in all of the models,
would increase the BFE term in the Risk equation by 100% for
SPCC and by 10,000% for ASO. Even for IMEC l's with a new E
value of .08 as in the basic linear model, the BFE term is
increased 800% for ASO. For SPCC, there would be a decrease
in the BFE term of 84% as E goes from .5 to .08. However,
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the dollar value of decreases in inventory levels would
probably not outweigh the dollar value of increases because
much of the cost increases would be associated with high
essential, high cost repairables and most of the cost
decreases would be attributed to low essential, low cost
consumables. [Ref. 9]
A recommended solution to this funding problem while
initially implementing these models would be to let the
essentiality factor E take on these new IMEC weights but keep
the product BE in the BFE term constant at whatever its value
is now. To do this, new shortage costs for B would have to
be computed. However, the end result would be no change in
the Risk factor, the resulting inventory levels, or funding.
A second step would be to change the IS values to meet new SMA
goals and obtain an estimate of what the new costs might be.
This could be done through the use of the CARES analyzer.
After the initial implementation phase, the wholesale
inventory models would at least have a method of utilizing
the essentiality factor E in the proper manner. This would
be a definite improvement over the current method of not
































• Basic linear model Basic linear model weighted by requistion frequency
a, IMEC2 x Basic linear model weighted by ship type
Figure 1: IMEC Essentiality Values for each Model
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IV. SUMMARY, CONCLUSIONS, AND RECOMMENDATIONS
A. SUMMARY
The primary objective of this thesis was to develop a
linear model or relationship for essentiality weighting for
items managed at the wholesale level based on the current
essentiality coding system. The primary reason behind this
objective was to be able to utilize the resulting
essentiality weights in the current Navy wholesale inventory
levels-setting models. The ultimate goal will hopefully be a
better stocking policy with increased levels of operational
effectiveness for those items which are highly essential.
Chapter II first reviewed the formulas currently used to
establish essentiality weighted inventory levels (Risk
formula, etc.) . It then described the current essentiality
coding system (MEC's, MCC's, and IMEC's). Finally, Chapter
II presented the current method used by SPCC and ASO for
indirectly adjusting inventory stockage levels with respect
to essentiality (different IMEC's have different SMA goals).
Chapter III presented four essentiality weighting models.
The first and third models (the basic model and the basic
model weighted by ship type) were essentially linear models;
that is, the relationship between the essentiality values and
the IMEC values was linear. The second model (the basic
model weighted by requisition frequency) was a non-linear
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model; that is, the relationship between the essentiality
values and the IMEC values was non-linear. These three
models were based on the assignment of subjective values for
MEC's and MCC's, with IMEC subjective values being computed
from a combination of the subjective values for MEC s and
MCC's.
2The fourth model, IMEC , was also a non-linear model.
Its major advantage is being simple in its weighting
computation and being easy to understand.
Finally, Chapter III presented a recommended method for
implementing these models.
B. CONCLUSIONS
The current model approved for use by SPCC and ASO to
indirectly weight inventory levels-setting by essentiality
may be adequate. It is simple, easy to program, and will
certainly meet the required SMA goals as set forth by higher
authority. However, it does have its drawbacks. It does not
use the E factor as it was designed to be used in the
inventory models. Rather than using the inventory models as
designed (i.e., working forwards through the inventory
levels-setting models starting with an E value) , an SMA goal
is established and, working backwards by adjusting the ft, the
levels are determined.
Throughout the interviews conducted at both SPCC and ASO,
the basic linear model proposed in Chapter III was generally
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accepted as feasible, and was considered to be "as good a
model as anyone else's." Almost all personnel interviewed
said it is very difficult to say how much more important one
IMEC is over another IMEC
.
The two additional versions of the basic linear model are
regarded as improvements. The first, and the one this author
prefers, is the basic linear model weighted by requisition
frequency. It appears to be a definite improvement over the
basic linear model
.
The second is the basic linear model weighted by ship
type. Unfortunately, it would be complicated to implement
and would have only limited applicability because it would
only pertain to SPCC items. It would be of no use to ASO
.
2The IMEC model is also a valid proposal and was
suggested by ASO personnel. Its appeal is its simplicity.
However, it may be too simple. Although the question of why
the relationship between IMEC's is equal to the squared IMEC
value can be posed, it may indeed apply to ASO managed items
.
Probably the major obstacle to using these new models is
that the current perceptions about the MEC, MCC, and IMEC
codes by most personnel at SPCC and ASO is one of uneasiness.
Are they currently assigned properly so that their values can
be trusted? Some of the points that support this perception
are
:
- They feel that too much subjectivity is involved in
the essentiality code assignment process. Although
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subjective decisions are certainly a part of the
process, they by no means dominate the process. The
codes are for the most part assigned based on valid
quantifiable data.
Until recently, procedures for assigning IMEC's,
MEC's, and MCC's were not widely documented and,
those that were, were somewhat vague and confusing.
If one were to read the applicable portions of
Reference 2 on the assignment procedures for the
codes, one would find it is rather confusing and does
not provide the reader with enough information about
the assignment process. Fortunately, progress is
being made in this area as a consequence of several
major documents discussing essentiality codes having
been written over the past two years. Reference 10
is one example.
The assignment of MCC's and IMEC's of for new
systems creates safety level and shortage problems
when the items transition to the wholesale
replenishment model. A lengthy period of time is
required to correct this situation and assign a
proper MCC and IMEC to the items.
No definite or permanent feedback loop has been
established to conduct validation checks on the
initial MEC, MCC, and IMEC assignments. Although
progress is being made in this area as evidenced by
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the Naval Sea Logistics Center's checking of MCC's
for SPCC managed items and the resystemization
efforts [Ref. 10], no formalized all-encompassing
program seems to be outlined. The major reason is
the lack of funds to conduct such a program.
However, since these essentiality codes are not
highly trusted and are also not used in the current
inventory models or by the inventory managers, it is
doubtful if funding will become available soon.
Until major changes in or attitudes toward essentiality
coding and the concept of essentiality are made, or the
current inventory models and goals are changed or replaced by
better models (e.g., the Mean Supply Response Time model
being developed at the Naval Postgraduate School), the
current essentiality weighting model described in Chapter II,
Section C, is the best available to accomplish and attain the
required goals. Until inventory managers and everyone else
involved in the process begins trusting and using IMEC's,
MEC's, and MCC's, the models proposed in Chapter III probably
won't be useful.
Lastly, funding will be a major problem for any
essentiality weighted inventory models. Neither the current
model nor the proposed models will probably be implemented
until adequate funding becomes available to support them.
Studies of the impact of the various essentiality models on
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the current inventory models should be conducted however
before funding is sought.
C. RECOMMENDATIONS
The following recommendations are offered for overall
improvement of the essentiality weighted coding systems:
1. Establish a feedback loop in the MEC, MCC, and IMEC
assignment system so that these codes can be checked
and verified. (Reference 10 and resystemization seems
to be attempting to correct this problem.)
2. Do not allow to be assigned as an initial MCC or
IMEC. Utilize as much of the provisioning data as
possible to make a reasonable estimate of what these
values should be up front, letting the contractor
assign the MCC if necessary, and adjust them later with
CASREP/maintenance data. At the very least, assign the
lowest code of 1 as the MCC and IMEC so that some
initial safety stock is provided and revise the codes
at a later date with CASREP/maintenance data.
3. Finally, and most important, an increased awareness of
MEC's, MCC's, and IMEC s should be provided through
better documentation, education, and management
attention
.
Initiating these changes will lay the groundwork for
implementing better essentiality weighted inventory models.
Once the improvements recommended above are initiated, an
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additional recommendation would be to implement one of the
IMEC weighting models proposed in Chapter III. So as not to
create a funding problem, implementation should be
accomplished by using the IMEC essentiality values for the
essentiality parameter E and revising the shortage costs IS so
that the ISE term remains constant at its present value. Then
CARES studies can be conducted to determine how essentiality
redistributes the inventory levels. If it works well,
funding may not be so difficult to obtain.
Finally, with regard to funding, one recommendation for
further study would be to evaluate the affect of lowering the
SMA goals for IMEC l's and 2's below 85%, thereby possibly
allowing for SMA goals of greater than 85% for IMEC 3's and
4's while keeping the funding constraint constant. What
would happen to operational effectiveness in this case?
A second recommendation would be to evaluate the impact
on funding levels if the basic linear model weighted by
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(a) CNO ltr Ser 412E/6U394562 of 12 Aug 86
(b) MIL-STD-1388-2A of 20 Jul 84
(c) MIL-STD-1629A of 24 Nov 80
(d) OASD (MRA&L) memo of 15 Oct 81
(e) CNO ltr Ser 412E/3U392481 of 8 Jul 83
(1) Guidance for Assignment of Part to Component MECs
(2) Item Mission Essentiality Code ( IMEC ) Derivation Based
on MIL-STD-1388-2A MEC Assignments
1. Reference (a) issued Readiness Based Sparing (RBS) policy
for new acquisition programs and requested that NAVSUP issue
detailed procedures to promote uniform Navy-wide compliance
with this policy. Accordingly, this letter requests that the
Navy Hardware Systems Commands invoke the requirement for
assignment of MIL-STD-1388-2A Military Essentiality Codes (MECs)
of reference (b) in accordance with the guidance contained in
enclosure (1). These MEC assignments should be included in the
provisioning process for all systems acquisitions for which a
not already been awarded. Where a contract has
awarded every effort should be made to modify
to require the more stringent enclosure (1)
This letter also, via enclosure (2), provides
the methodology that will be used for deriving Item Mission






2. The new MEC assignment criteria
Material Establishment Provisioning
prised of representatives from the N
the Naval Sea Systems Command, and t
Systems Command and chaired by the N
In aidition to providing guidance on
personnel safety items, enclosure (
1
assign 3 variations of part to compo
current 2 variation policy. These (A
based on Failure Modes, Effects, and
in accordance with reference (c).
were developed by the Naval
Policy Group which is corn-
aval Air Systems Command,
he Naval Space and Warfare
aval Supply Systems Command.
assignment of MEC 5 to denote
) provides guidance on how to
nent essentiality vice the






3. Enclosure (1) is consistent with references (b), (d) , and
(e), and will permit the Navy to properly use readiness oriented
models. Iff order to properly use readiness oriented models it is
essential that accurate part to component MECs are assigned as
well as realistic failure rates and unit prices. It is estimated
that only about 40 percent of items currently coded as MEC 1
comply with the definition in reference (b). The remaining
60 percent, although not all MEC 3 items, must currently be
assigned that MEC since none other exists. Implementation of
enclosure (1) will enhance Navy attempts to improve readiness at
least cost.
4. Request all SYSCOMs implement the MEC assignment criteria
of enclosure (1) and require that Provisioning Technical
Documentation (PTD) for all new acquisitions provide MECs in
accordance with this guidance. The NAVSUP point of contact
for this effort is Mr. Lenny Burdick (NAVSUP 0319), Commercial
(202) 695-7121, Autovon 225-7121.
Copy to:
CNO (OP 412)
aso (ws) ' y







GUIDANCE FOR ASSIGNMENT OF PART TO COMPONENT MECs
Military Essentiality Code (MEC). This code indicates the degree
to which "unavai 1 abi 1 i ty of a replacement for an installed item
wnen needed to perform corrective maintenance affects the ability
of the end item (e.g., radar set, fire control system, electrical-
generator) to perform its primary function in the intended
manner. The need to perform corrective maintenance is normally
the result of failure of an item and so essentiality is commonly
evaluated in the context of item failure, but it must be
remembered thdt some parts may be needed for replacement owing to
their use when replacing other failed parts (e.g., gaskets).
I. CODE 1
A. MIL-STD-1338-2A Definition
B. Guidance on Assignment of ;
Failure of this item will
render the end item
i noperabl e.
1. Failure of this item in its normal failure modes
will result in total and catastrophic failure of the end item or
a critical function of the end item.
or 2. This item is a part which normally is not considered
to fail but is required to be installed, along with an item whose
failure will result in total and catastrophic failure of the end
item (e.g., gaskets, seals-, etc.).
3. Tn i s item monitors a critical function and a
malfunction will disenable an operators capability to recognize a
catastrophic failure.
I I CODE 3
A. MIL-STD- 1383-2A Definition : Failure of this part will
not render the end item
i noperabl e.
8 . Guidance on Assignment of :
1. Failure of this item in its normal failure modes




A. M I L-STD- 1 3 8 3 - 2A Definition;
B. OP-41 Approved Definitiont
Item does not qualify for
assignment of Code 1, but is
needed for personnel safety.
Item may or may not qualify
for assignment of Code 1,
but is needed for personnel
safety.
C. Guidance on Assignment of;
1. Failure without immediate replacement or lack of
this item will directly and immediately infringe on the safety of
personnel operating or maintaining the equipment. This code
should not be assigned to parts or assemblies which are installed
in systems whose primary purpose is. safety of ship/aircraft or
personnel simply because of that system relationship unless the
item separately meets the first part of this guidance.
2. If an item qualifies for MEC 5, it should be
assigned MEC 5 regardless of what other MEC it also qualifies
for.
IV. CODE 7
A. MIL-STD-1388-2A Definition; Item does not qualify for
the assignment of Code 1
but is needed to prevent
impairment or the temporary
reduction of operational
effect ivenesss of the end
item.














Failure of this item in any of its normal failure
t result in total and catastrophic failure of the
rather will result in only partial degradation of
allowing continued operation within acceptable
anges. Items should be classified as MEC 7 if their
e modes are gradual deterioration or wear and such
ioracion or wear is noticeable or detectable prior
ng maximum limits. Items should also be classified
edundancy provides for continued operation after
e unit of an item but at reduced by acceptade
apability. If redundancy provides for continued
er failure of one unit of an item at normal capacity
, assignment of MEC 3 is appropriate.
2
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Enclosure ( 1 )
2. This assignment applies to ail built in test
circuitry which is critical to the monitoring or fault isolation
of the end item. The exception applies to those components which










, 2, 3, 4 or 5
















WORKING PAPER ON MEC ASSIGNMENT
Naval Sea Logistics Center (NAVSEALOGCEN)
,
Mechanicsburg, PA, Working Paper for the Readiness
Based Sparing Experiment for DDG-52 on Military
Essentiality Code (MEC) assignment, discussing the
procedures for DDG-52 MEC assignment, including
presenting two new MEC codes (8 and 9) and providing
flow charts for MEC assignment.
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Military Essentiality Codes (MEC) indicate the degree to which the
failure of a part affects the ability of the end item to perform
its intended purpose. The codes are defined as follows:
1 Failure of this part will immediately render the end item
inoperable
.
3 Failure of this part will not render the end item inoperable
since the function of this part is not associated with a
primary mission.
5 Failure of this part will create an immediate potential for
the person operating or maintaining the end item to risk
injury or death.
7 Failure of this part occurs gradually and the degradation of
performance is observable and measurable and when fully
failed will render end item inoperable.
8 Failure of this part limits the capability of the end item,
since redundancy permits the end item to continue to function
but with reduced capability.
9 Failure of this part will not immediately affect the perfor-
mance of the end item nor will' failure immediately reduce the
capability of the end item because of a redundant design or
alternatives.
General Guidance
The above definitions are subject to multiple interpreta-
tions. The following guidance is intended to reduce subjectivity
and amplify the definitions with examples applicable to an automo-
bile. The design includes many features which are intended to
provide insurance that the user will enjoy a safe return without
any delays due to major maintenance along the way.
The attached flow chart provides a systematic approach to the
MEC assignment process. The approach is to begin at the highest
level of indenture, the automobile, on the parts list which is
provided and work down to determine the first level of indenture
at which maintenance can be performed. The indenturing will be
identified by LCN (LSA Control Number), RSN (Reference Symbol
Number) or another recognized means of displaying an end item in
hierarchical sequence. For the purpose of this task, the mainte-
nance will be limited to that which was designed for the Organiza-
tional Level.
This can be identified by the third and fourth position of
the SM&R (Source, Maintenance and Recoverability) Code. The list
also includes the part number, CAGE (Commercial and Government
Entity) Code and NSN (National Stock Number).
When an item coded for Organizational maintenance is identi-
fied, the drawing package, technical manual, data block tree or
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similar documentation may have to be consulted to ensure that
fault detection, fault isolation and corrective action is within
Organizational maintenance. If an FMEA has been done, it should
be the first source to determine the mode of failure or modes of
failure attributable to the item in its application. Each failure
mode must be independently analyzed for the severity of impact on
the end item associated with the failure. All other parts are
assumed to be operational when the failure occurs. Secondary
failures or failures which are induced by the failure of a related
part should be considered as independent events. Severity should
be assessed as follows:
Castrophic/Critical j Immediate loss of at least one primary
function or the result of an immediate
potential hazard which can cause
serious injury or death.
Marginal: Reduced capability or degraded
performance of at least one primary
function.
Minor: No loss of capability or performance,
however, the failure will result in an
unscheduled maintenance action.
Since each failure mode is identified and analyzed as an
independent event, each part may fit more than one definition of
severity. When this occurs, the MEC assignment will be made
according to the moat severe failure mode.. The most severe
failure mode must be reasonably probable. It will normally be a
single point failure and not be caused by an unlikely chain of
events.
Each level of indenture must be assessed independently. The
importance of a part can be equal to, or less than, the relative
importance of the next higher assembly. Additionally, whenever an
item is assigned MEC 3 all lower identical parts are MEC 3. The
order of MEC importance in descending order is as follows:
MEC 5 , MEC 1 , MEC 8 , MEC 7 , MEC 9 ,. MEC 3
The following information is intended to amplify definitions
and provide an example of each. MEC code. Again the example end
item is an automobile; Most end items will be defined by the
related APL (Allowance Parts List)
.
MEC 5
An MEC 5 will be assigned to an item which meets all of the
following conditions:
o It's failure, when it is expected to be functioning, will
subject a person operating or maintaining the end item to
an immediate risk of death or injury.
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o Any risk will not be dependent on the occurrence of some
second event following the failure of the part being
examined but will be created solely by its failure.
o The failure must be immediately detectable making the
availability of a spare critical to safe resumption of
operations or maintenance.
Example:
An example of an MEC 5 is the hood counterbalance spring. The
automobile continues tO
s
function as intended with the broken
spring. Note that MECs' of 1, 7, 8, 9 or 3 do not apply. The
assignment of an MEC 3 would have applied, but, the mechanic
should not attempt to service the engine until the spring is
replaced and maintenance can be performed safely under the hood.
The hazard lights on the automobile do not meet the criteria for
an assignment of an MEC 5, even though their intended purpose is
to reduce risk to the operator. The risk would only arise with
the presence of some other condition in conjunction with the
failure of the hazard lights.
MEC 1
An MEC 1 will be assigned when the most severe failure mode dis-
ables at least one of the end items primary functions .
Example:
An example of an MEC 1 is a tire. A tire can be punctured such -
that it experiences sudden and complete deflation. Most auto-
mobile tires and rims are of such a design that the automobile
can't be used without all four tires. Also note that tires have
multiple modes of failure. A tire's useful life can be 40 or 50
thousand miles. It wears gradually. Although the tire is
designed to wear gradually, there is a reasonable chance of sudden
puncture. Therefore, an assignment of an MEC 1 is appropriate.
MEC 8
An MEC 8 will be assigned to an item which is associated with
designed redundancy or alternatives.. Ordinarily, the failure of
the item Would disable the end item in at least one of it's
primary functions, however, because of the redundant design, the
end item is still capable of performing but at reduced capacity.
The intent of the MEC 8 is to provide a recognition of the
redundancy and to respect the design integrity. An additional
condition is that the failure must be within normal maintenance
capability.
Example:
An example of an MEC 8 is a failure of the overdrive gear in a
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standard transmission. Although the automobile can still continue
to function the designed capability of the automobile is reduced
as the lower gearing ratio limits the potential speed and will
increase the stress on the engine at high speeds. Although a
detectable failure has occurred, the automobile is still able to
function, albeit at a reduced capability.
MEC 7
An MEC 7 will be assigned to an item which meets all of the
following conditions:
o The item is not associated with redundancy.
o Its primary failure modes are not sudden, but gradual in
nature as deterioration or reduced functioning over time.
o It's deterioration or reduced performance is detectable as
it is occurring, allowing for the ordering and receipt of
a replacement part prior to the installed unit deterio-
rating to the point that its performance is no longer
acceptable.
o The rate of deterioration is such that normal, direct
turnover supply response times will allow a requisitioned
part to be received prior to total failure.
o At it's final, fully deteriorated state, it will disable
the end item in at least one of its primary functions.
Example:
An example of an MEC 7 is an oil seal on the crankshaft. Normal
failure of the seal is gradual development of an oil leak past the
seal, with evidence being an accumulation of an oil spot. The
engine can continue to be operated in this condition, perhaps
requiring more frequent replenishment of oil, but the replacement
of the seal can be deferred.
MEC 9
An MEC 9 is also associated with redundancy. However, the assign-
ment of the MEC 9 will be based upon all of the following:
o The failure of the item will not immediately diminish any
capability or performance applicable to a primary function
of the end item.
o The failure is recognizable at the instant it occurs.
o The failure mode is independent and will not lead to a
series of secondary failures.
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Example:
An example of an MEC 9 is the failure of the low beam front head-
light. The automobile still retains the use of two high beams as
well as the other low beam. The headlight is properly assigned an
MEC 9.
MEC 3
An MEC 3 will be assigned to an item whose failure does not impair
any primary function since the function of this part is not
associated with any primary function. However, the failure will
result in an unscheduled maintenance action.
Example:
An example of a MEC 3 is the turn signal flasher which, when not
working, does not impair any of the automobiles primary functions.
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Enclosures (2) through (5) of Reference 1, Naval Sea
Systems Command (NAVSEA) Instruction 4441.11, Mission
Criticality Codes (MCC's) for Shipboard Use , Serial
9052/2198, dated 16 February, 1985, describing the
current procedures for determining MCC assignment.
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NAVSEAINST 44 41.11
16 Feb 8 5
MCC Assignment Procedures
(Active Fleet)
Step 1 - Establish a Mission Criticality Code Matrix File (MCCMF)
of all MCCs assigned to active fleet or recent new
construction ships as a result of CASREP analyses or
other tasking. This file, approved for development by
NAVSEA in 20 November 1981, currently exists for the
majority of active fleet ships and links Equipment
Identification Code (EIC) to MCC to ship, ship type
and/or class. MCCs presently included in the MCCMF for
active fleet ships were approved on a total ship basis
by the cognizant NAVSEA Ship Acquisition Program
Manager (SHAPM) or Ship Logistic Manager (SLM) using
separate review procedures. Additional active fleet
ships added to the MCCMF shall utilize similar review
procedures until the new construction/major
conversion procedures described in Enclosure (2) take
effect. The MCCMF shall be used for both direct
"on-line" retrieval of data and batch processing of
information when required. (Note: For future new
construction programs, the MCCMF shall link
functional group code (FGC) to MCC to ship, ship type
and/or class.
)
Action: NAVSEALOGSUPENGACT Assist: SPCC
Step 2 - Upon receipt of a ship's Configuration Change Form (CCF)
(OPNAV. Form 4790/CK) from an active fleet ship wbich.
covers a configuration change or addition, ensure that
the correct EIC and/or FGC (when authorized) has been
included on the CCF prior to forwarding the change to
the Ships Parts Control Center (SPCC)
.
Action: NAVSEACEN
Step 3 - Using the MCCMF, assign MCCs to each CCF prior to




Step 4 - If the MCC cannot be determined based on guidance
contained in the MCCMF, assign an MCC of either *T" or
"Z" to enable the data on the OPNAV Form 4790/CK to be
introduced immediately into the WSF. A "T" (denoting
temporary) shall be used to identify 4790/CK entries
where the EIC (or FGC) is complete but no MCC policy
guidance exists in the MCCMF for the system or
equipment. A "Z" shall be used where the EIC (or FGC)





complete to permit the configuration change to be
identified to an MCC in the MCCMF. Pass all MCC "Ts" to
NAVSEALOGSUPENGACT for review and all MCC "Zs" to the
NAVSEACENs for further EIC (or FGC) assignment and
resubmittal.
Action: SPCC
Step 5 - Review MCC "Ts" passed in step 4 to determine if MCCs
can be assigned based on information available at
NAVSEALOGSUPENGACT but not yet included in the MCCMF.
Pass all MCCs which cannot be assigned and are not the
responsibility of NAVSEALOGSUPENGACT to the appropriate
NAVSEA Life Cycle Manager for initial assignment of MCC.
Action: NAVSEALOGSUPENGACT
Step 6 - Assign MCCs to all temporary entries received in step 5,
prepare cover letter to NAVSEALOGSUPENGACT, and forward
to the cognizant Ship Logistic Manager (SLM) for final
approval.
Action: NAVSEA Life Cycle Manager
Step 7 - Approve MCC assignment and release cover letter to NAVSEA-
LOGSUPENGACT.
Action: SLM
Step 8 - Provide listings of all "T" and "Z" coded MCCs evejry six
months to "either NAVSEALOGSUPENGACT or NAVSEACENs , as
appropriate, for. review.
Action: SPCC
Step 9 - Review all "T" coded MCCs at no less than six months
intervals to monitor timely MCC assignment by the
appropriate NAVSEA SLM.
Action: NAVSEALOGSUPENGACT
Step 10 - Review all "Z" coded MCCs at no less than six month
intervals to ensure that EIC (or FGC) voids have been
filled.
Action: NAVSEACENs
Step 11 - Treat MCC "Ts" and "Zs" as MCC "Is" if they cannot be
converted to proper MCCs at the time of Coordinated






"Zs" on file until the correct MCC value has been
assigned. This action will ensure that the equipments
involved shall, as a minimum, receive support equivalent
to that currently provided by the Fleet Logistic Support







(New Construction, Major Conversion)
Steps 1 through 6 - Applicable to New Construction Only
Step 1 - Advise the Naval Sea Systems Command Logistic Support
Engineering Activity (NAVSEALOGSUPENGACT) of any new
ship type (including TOP Level Requirements as estab-
lished by the Chief of Naval Operations (CNO) for which
Mission Criticality Code (MCC) assignments are planned.
Action: Ship Acquisition Program Manager (SHAPM)
Step 2 - Provide the SHAPM and designated Ship Design Agent (SDA)
for contract design with hard copy printouts of a proto-
typical list of MCCs that have previously been assigned
to systems/equipments on similar ship types/classes
based on Casualty Reporting (CASREP) data or other
analyses conducted on recent new construction ships.
Action: NAVSEALOGSUPENGACT
Step 3 - Perform a Reliability, Maintainability and Availability
(RM&A) analysis and assign Functional Group Codes (FGCs)
and MCCs to systems and major equipments. FGCs will be
assigned in accordance with the "Class Standard Expanded
Ship Work Breakdown Structure (ESWBS) Manual. Data
provided in Step 2 and other available resources (e.g.
TIGER model simulations) may.be used as guidance ^n the .
assignment of MCCs. Incorporate FGC and MCC assignments
into Appendix A. of the Class Standard Manual developed
for the new construction program.
Action: Ship Design Agent responsible for contract
design
Step 4 - After coordination of MCC assignments with the appro-
priate Participating Authority Requirements Managers
(PARMs) and equipment Life Cycle Managers (LCMs) submit
Appendix A of the Class Standard Manual to the CNO plat-
form manager for MCC approval and subsequent incorpora-
tion into the applicable OPNAV "Plan for Use" Instruc-
tion.
Action: SHAPM
Step 5 - Use the approved Appendix A of the Ship Class Manual to
assign MCCs to subordinate equipments associated with
the parent system or equipment. Include MCC Assignments
on the Functional Configuration Baseline Index author-






Step 6 - Incorporate the approved Appendix A of the Ship Class
Manual into the MCC Matrix File (MCCMF) . This file,
approved for development by NAVSEA in November 1981,
shall, for new construction ships, link FGC to MCC to
ship, ship type and/or class. (Note: If the Equipment
Identification Code is designated as the approved func-
tional identifier in selected new construction programs
in lieu of the FGC, the MCCMF shall be based on an EIC
to MCC linkage.) Based on approved NAVSEA policy, the
MCCMF shall be used to assign MCCs to all Fitting-Out
Management Information System (FOMIS) inputs subse-
quently received from the contractor (shipbuilder) prior
to their inclusion into the Weapon Systems File (WSF)
.
The MCCMF shall also be capable of providing direct
"on-line" retrieval of data and/or batch processing of
information where required.
Action: NAVSEALOGSUPENGACT Assist: SPCC
Steps 7 through 11 - Applicable to Major Conversion Only
Step 7 - Advise NAVSEALOGSUPENGACT of any major conversion pro-
gram for which significant MCC revisions are planned.
Action: SHAPM
Step 8 - Provide the SHAPM with tape and hard copy printouts of
the MCCMF previously established for the conversion ship
based on - CASREP or other data used to initially assign
MCCs.
Action: NAVSEALOGSUPENGACT
Step 9 - Review the data provided in Step 8 and revise MCCs, as
necessary, to conform to configuration and/or mission
changes resulting from the conversion. Assign MCCs to
all new systems and equipments not previously installed.
Coordinate MCC assignments with Participating Authority
Requirements Managers (PARMs) and Life Cycle Managers
(LCMs) as required. Forward all revisions to NAVSEALOG-
SUPENGACT for update of the MCCMF.
Action: SHAPM
Step 10 - Update the MCCMF based on data provided by the SHAPM in
Step 9.
Action: NAVSEALOGSUPENGACT Assist: SPCC
Step 11 - If the scope of the conversion requires a revision to
the applicable OPNAV "Plan for Use" Instruction, submit
a matrix of all new and changed MCCs to the CNO platform





16 Feb 8 5
Remaining steps applicable to both New Construction and Major
Conversion Ships
Step 12 - Incorporate information on approved MCCs in all applic-
able Ship Project Directives (SPDs) issued to PARMs
which involve essentiality coding. Maintain a record of
approved MCCs for subsequent use by PARMs and LCMs in
the development of Program Support Data Sheets (PSDs) .
Action: SHAPM
Step 13 - Submit FOMIS inputs in accordance with the data element
content and format as defined in the Fitting-Out Manage-
ment Information System (FOMIS) Requirements Statement
(FRS) . Each FOMIS input shall include the Functional
Group Code (FGC) and/or Equipment Identification Code
(EIC) (when authorized) . MCCs need not be included in
FOMIS inputs for new construction and major conversion
ships since they will be assigned by the MCCMF previous-
ly established or updated as described in Steps 6 or 10.
Action: Contractor (Shipbuilder)
Step 14 - Pass all FOMIS inputs through the MCCMF to identify the
correct MCC to be loaded into the WSF.
Action: SPCC Assist: NAVSEALOGSOPENGACT
Step 15 - If the MCC cannot be determined based on the guidance
contained in the MCCMF, assign an MCC of either "T" or
"Z" to enable the FOMIS input to be introduced immediate-
ly into the WSF. A "T" (denoting temporary) shall be
used to identify FOMIS entries where the FGC and/or EIC
(where authorized) is complete but no MCC is included in
the MCCMF for that particular system or equipment. A
"Z" shall be used where the FGC and/or EIC is incomplete
or missing and prevents identification to a valid MCC in
the MCCMF. Pass all MCC "Ts" or "Zs" to NAVSEALOGSUPENG-
ACT for review.
Action: SPCC
Step 16 - Review MCC "Ts" and "Zs" passed in Step 15 to determine
if MCCs can be assigned based on information available
at NAVSEALOGSUPENGACT but not yet included in the MCCMF.
Pass all items for which MCCs cannot be assigned to the
SHAPM for decision.
Action: NAVSEALOGSUPENGACT
Step 17 - Assign MCCs to all "T" and "Z" entries received in Step






Step 18 - Forward MCCs received in Step 17 to SPCC for inclusion
in the MCCMF and WSF.
Action: NAVSEALOGSUPENGACT
Step 19 - Develop and submit to the appropriate NAVSEA coordinator,
initial equipment program data in the form of PSD sheets
as soon as the acquisition program is approved. PSD
sheets shall include MCCs previously approved and pro-
vided by the SHAPM in Step 12. Submit changes to the
basic PSDs as revisions occur.
Action: PARMs and LCMs
Step 20 - Screen all MCCs on PSDs received from acquisition man-
agers against the MCCMF to ensure that the MCC conforms
to previous guidance received. Submit all discrepancies
to NAVSEALOGSUPENGACT for reconciliation.
Action: SPCC
Step 21 - Reconcile all MCC discrepancies received in Step 20 with
the SHAPM and advise SPCC on a final decision in time to









Step 1 - Establish a Mission Criticality Code (MCC) Matrix File of
all MCCs assigned to active fleet or recent new cons-
truction ships as a result of either CASREP analyses or
other tasking. This file, approved for development by
NAVSEA in November 1981, currently exists for the
majority of active fleet ships and links Equipment
Identification Code (EIC) to MCC to ship, ship type
and/or class. The MCCMF shall be used for both direct
"on-line" retrieval of data and batch processing of
information when required. (Note: For future new
construction programs, the MCCMF shall link Functional
Group Code (FGC) to ship, ship type and/or class.
Action: NAVSEALOGSUPENGACT Assist: SPCC
Step 2 - Using the MCCMF, assign MCCs to each configuration input
received prior to loading the configuration change into
the Weapon Systems File (WSF) . Summary Listing of
Component Changes (SLCCs) submitted prior to Start of
Overhaul (SOH) by the Naval Supervising Activity (NSA)
shall be processed in accordance with current Integrated
Logistics Overhaul (ILO) schedules and the MCCs incorpor-
ated into the SOH Coordinated Shipboard Allowance List
(COSAL) . Where two COSALs have been authorized (i.e.,
where the duration of the overhaul period warrants the
publication of both an SOH COSAL and a Load COSAL) , all
SLCCs received prior to the Load COSAL cut-off shall be
processed against the MCCMF and included in the Load
COSAL. All such data shall be incorporated in the post
overhaul COSAL Index published at End-of-Overhaul (EOH)
plus 120 days.
Action: SPCC
Step 3 - If an MCC cannot be determined based on guidance con-
tained in the MCCMF, assign an MCC of either "T" or "Z"
to enable the data on the SLCC to be introduced immedi-
ately into the WSF. A "T" (denoting temporary) shall be
used to identify SLCC entries where the EIC (or FGC) is
complete but no MCC policy guidance exists in the MCCMF
for the system or equipment. A "Z" shall be used where
an incomplete or missing EIC (or FGC) prevents identifi-
cation to an MCC in the MCCMF. Pass all MCC "Ts" and






Step 4 - Review MCC "Ts" and "Zs" to determine if MCCs can be
assigned based on information available at NAVSEA-
LOGSUPENGACT but not yet included in the MCCMF. Pass all
items for which MCCs cannot be assigned and are not the
the responsibility of NAVSEALOGSUPENGACT to the approp-
riate NAVSEA Life Cycle Manager for decision.
Action: NAVSEALOGSUPENGACT
Step 5 - Assign MCCs to all "T" and "Z" entries received in
step 4, prepare cover letter to NAVSEALOGSUPENGACT, and
forward to the cognizant Ship Logistic Manager (SLM) for
final approval.
Action: NAVSEA LCM
Step 6 - Approve MCC assignment and release cover letter to
NAVSEALOGSUPENGACT.
Action: SLM
Step 7 - Provide listings of all "T" and "Z" coded MCCs every six
months to NAVSEALOGSUPENGACT.
Action: SPCC
Step 8 - Review all "T" and "Z" coded MCCs at no less than six
month intervals to monitor timely assignments of perma-
nent MCCs by the appropriate NAVSEA SLM.
Action: NAVSEALOGSUPENGACT
Step 9 - Treat MCC "Ts" and "Zs" as MCC "Is" if they have not been
converted to permanent MCCs at the time of COSAL produc-
tion. Retain the MCC "Ts" and "Zs" on file until the
correct MCC value has been assigned. This action will
ensure that the equipment involved shall, as a minimum,
receive support equivalent to that currently provided by
the Fleet Logistic Support Improvement Program (FLSIP)
COSAL computational model.
Action: SPCC
Steps 10 and 11 are applicable to MCCs for equipments and compon-
ents that could not be incorporated in either the SOH or Load
COSAL.
Step 10 - To determine the correct repair part support required for
equipments and components that could not be incorporated





ized) , the following procedures shall be used locally to
obtain an MCC:
a. Identify the MCCs assigned to other equipments
and components installed in the same system. If all are
identical, assign the same MCC. If MCCs vary within sys-
tem, use the MCC that applies to equipments and compon-
ents in that segment of the system in which the new
equipment or component is to be installed.
b. If the new item is to be installed in a system
that is not presently covered in the SOH COSAL, request
NAVSEALOGSUPENGACT by letter to provide the correct MCC.
Note: When real time capabilities are established for
the MCCMF, direct interrogation can be accomplished by
those activities having accessing hardware. In the in-
terim, it is planned to provide users with hard copy
printouts of the MCCMF which provide MCCs by EIC (or FGC)
within ship/ship class.
Action: NSA
Step 11 - Furnish MCCs for all requests received within 10 days of
receipt. If an MCC cannot be determined based on avail-
able guidance, assign an MCC of "T" or "Z" and advise the
NSA to treat the equipment or component as a secondary
mission item and procure conventional FLSIP support.
Follow steps 5 through 8 for all "T" and "Z" coded MCC









(Note: This enclosure applies to all recommendations to assign
Mission Criticality Codes (MCCs) which differ from MCCs previously
approved by Ship Acquisition Program Managers (SHAPMs) or Ship
Logistic Managers (SLMs) . Steps 1 through 8 apply to fleet recom-
mendations; steps 9 through 16 apply to Participating Authority
Requirements Managers (PARMs) , Life Cycle Managers (LCM) , In-
Service Engineering Agents (ISEAs) or other authorized activity
recommendations.
)
Steps 1 through 8 - Applicable to Fleet Recommendations
Step 1 - Forward an Allowance Change Request (ACR) (NAVSUP
1220-2) prepared in accordance with NAVSEAINST 4441.2
for all proposed MCC changes which differ from approved
MCCs. ACRs shall include full justification for the
change and shall be forwarded to the appropriate TYCOM.
Action: Active Fleet Ships
Step 2 - Recommend approval or disapproval of all MCC ACRs re-
ceived and coordinate with other TYCOMs as appropriate.
Forward all ACR changes recommended for approval to the
applicable processing control point (PCP) designated in
NAVSEA Instruction 4441.2. (Note: For the majority of
shipboard equipments, NAVSEALOGSUPENGACT is the appli-
cable PCP. If the PCP is not NAVSEALOGSUPENGACT, the
PCP shall be responsible for coordinating with NAVSEA-
LOGSUPENGACT in the accomplishment of step 3.)
Action: TYCOM
Step 3 - Screen all ACRs against the MCC Matrix File (MCCMF)
established for maintaining control of MCC assignments
and determine if the change has not already been made as
a result of previous approval action. If the MCC in the
MCCMF has already been changed to conform with the ACR,
advise the ship and TYCOM that the ACR is approved and
to revise the COSAL accordingly. If the proposed change
is at variance with the MCCMF, forward the change to the
appropriate NAVSEA LCM for initial decision. Provide
installed population data and the estimated cost to
implement the MCC change under the Modified Fleet







Step 4 - Assign initial MCCs to all ACRs provided in step 3 and
forward the ACR to the appropriate SHAPM or SLM for
final decision.
Action: LCM
Step 5 - Approve or disapprove MCC recommendations received in
step 4. If an MCC change via ACR results in an extended
dollar value increase of $25,000 or more, coordinate the
change with NAVSEA 9054 to ensure funds are available to
implement the change.
Action: SHAPM or SLM
Step 6 - Review all ACRs submitted by SHAPM or SLM. If funds are
not available to implement a recommended MCC increase,
advise the SHAPM or SLM as to what actions shall be
taken to obtain the necessary funding and a best
estimate of the earliest implementation date.
Action: SEA 9054
Step 7 - Forward all MCC ACR decisions to the submitting activity
TYCOM, NAVSEALOGSUPENGACT, PCP (if different from
NAVSEALOGSUPENGACT) and Ships Parts Control Center
(SPCC) (approved ACRs only) . MCC ACR decisions shall
also be provided to the appropriate equipment manager.
On disapproval of MCC ACBs, indicate the reason for dis-
approval." MCC ACR increases deferred for lack of''funds
shall include a best estimate of the earliest
implementation date.
Action: SHAPM or SLM
Step 8 — Revise the MCCMF to reflect all approved MCC changes.
MCC changes deferred for lack of funds shall not be
introduced into the MCCMF until advised by the SHAPM or
SLM.
Action: NAVSEALOGSUPENGACT
Step 9 - • Revise all applicable files including the Weapon Systems
File (WSF) to reflect all approved MCC changes. When an
MCC increase causes a secondary mission equipment or
component (e.g., MCC 1 or 2) to be redesignated as a
primary mission equipment or component (e.g., MCC 3 or
4), provide a .10 MOD-FLSIP General Distribution Allowance
Parts List (APL) to the ship(s) to enable the additional






Steps 9 through 16 - Applicable to PARM, LCM, ISEA or Other
Authorized Activity Recommendations
Step 10 - Submit a letter request or memorandum to the appropriate
SHAPM or SLM for all proposed MCC changes which differ
from currently approved MCCs . Full justification shall
be provided for all recommended changes.
Action: PARM, LCM, ISEA or other authorized activity
Step 11 - Review all requests provided in step 10 and approve or
disapprove, as appropriate. If the extended dollar
value of the request for fleet ships is greater than
$25,000, the SHAPM or SLM shall obtain the approval of
SEA 9054 to ensure that funds are available to implement
the change.
Action: SHAPM or SLM
Step 12 - Same as step 6.
Action: SEA 9054
Step 13 - Forward all approved MCC decisions to the submitting
activity, NAVSEALOGSUPENGACT, PCP (if different from
NAVSEALOGSUPENGACT) and SPCC. Return disapproved
requests to the submitting activity and indicate the
reason for disapproval: MCC increases deferred for lack
of funds shall include a best- estimate of earliest
implementation date.
Action: SHAPM or SLM
Step 14 - If the disapproval by SHAPM/SLM is not concurred in,
provide the SHAPM or SLM with additional justification
(Note: All disputes in MCC assignments which cannot be
resolved between the SHAPMs or SLMs and the submitting
activity shall be forwarded to SEA 91 or 92 for final
decision)
.
Action: PARM, LCM, ISEA or other authorized activity
Step 15 - Same as step 8.
Action: NAVSEALOGSUPENGACT





EXCERPT FROM THE MISSION CRITICALITY CODE MATRIX FILE (MCCMF)
Example of how the Mission Criticality Code Matrix
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Excerpt from Reference 8, Chief of Naval Operations
(OPNAV) Instruction 5442. 4L, Aircraft and Training
Devices Material Condition Definitions, Mission-
Essential Subsystems Matrices (MESMS) , and Mission
Descriptions
,
Serial OP-515, dated 15 October, 1987,
giving the procedures for assigning Equipment
Operation Capability (EOC) codes.
91




TYPE EQUIPMENT CODES: AMAA, AMAC
Do not assign an EOC code if all equipment is operational. The
aircraft is OPC.
Assign alpha character (B) of the EOC code when the following





AUTOMATIC DIRECTION FINDER SET
VIDEO TAPE RECORDER (NOTE 1)
STRIKE CAMERA SYSTEM (NOTES 1,2)
Assign alpha character (C) of the EOC code when the following
system (s) are inoperative preventing the escort/strike mission.
The aircraft is not capable of independent detection and
destruction of aircraft/missiles under all-weather conditions or
providing protective escort for strike and support forces using
all air-to-air weapons in a multi-threat ECM environment. The
aircraft is PMC, M or S.
WEAPON SYSTEM CONTROL FUNCTION (HOTAS) (NOTES 3,4)
MISSILE ILLUMINATION GROUP SPARROW
SPARROW MISSILE EJECTOR LAUNCHER
LAU-116 (NOTES 1,2)
Assign alpha character (D) of the EOC code when the following
system (s) are inoperative preventing the strike mission. The
aircraft is not capable of conducting interdiction or war-at-sea
missions using all weapons and delivery modes compatible with
aircraft regardless of terrain, weather or enemy defenses. The
aircraft is PMC, M or S.
AMAC SYSTEM (NOTE 1)
Assign alpha character (J) of the EOC code when the following
system (s) are inoperative preventing the visual attack mission.
The aircraft is not capable of conducting missions under VMC,
using system deliveries of conventional ordnance, conducting
anti-radiation missile strike support, close air support for
friendly forces with forward air controller. The aircraft is PMC,
M or S.











ARMAMENT CONTROL PROC SET
SELECTIVE STORES JETTISON SYSTEM
LASER SPOT TRACKER AND ADAPTER
FLIR POD AND ADAPTER
SIDEWINDER MISSILE SYSTEM
SIDEWINDER LAUNCHERS (LAU-7A)
WEAPON RELEASE RACKS (BRU-32/A)
WING PYLONS (SUU-63)
CENTERLINE PYLON (SUU-62)
PALLETIZED GUN SYSTEM (M61A1)
THREAT WARNING LIGHT DISPLAY GROUP
RADAR WARNING RECEIVER (ALR-67)
CHAFF COUNTERMEASURES SET (ALE-3 9)


















Assign alpha character (K) of the EOC code when the following
system (s) are inoperative preventing the expanded mobility
mission. The aircraft is not capable of safe movement on and off
CV/SATs during day, night and inclement weather conditions,
conducting independent navigation, using encrypted radio voice
communications and IFF, or in-flight refueling (receive). The
aircraft is PMC, M or S.
BOARDING LADDER DRAG BRACE
CATAPULT SYSTEM
WING FOLD
AIR REFUELING PROBE FLOOD LIGHT
AIR REFUEL PROBE
APPROACH POWER COMPENSATOR SYSTEM
ANGLE-OF-ATTACK SYSTEM AND INDEX LIGHTS
RECEIVER TRANSMITTER PROCESSOR (RT-1379/ASW) (NOTE 6)
SECURE IFF (KIT 1A) (MODE 4) (NOTE 1)
SECURE VOICE (KY-58) (NOTE 1)
ILS RECEIVER/DECODER (ARA-63) (NOTE 6)
RADAR BEACON (APN-202) (NOTE 6)
SECONDARY POWER SUPPLY (APU)
Assign alpha character (L) of the EOC code when the following
system(s) are inoperative preventing the IMC flight mission. The
aircraft is not capable of day or night IMC field flight
operations with necessary communications, IFF, navigation, flight
and safety systems reguired by applicable NATOPS and FAA









(POSITION AND FORMATION) (NOTE 7)
WINDSHIELD ANTI-ICE AND RAIN REMOVAL
WHEEL ANTI-SKID CONTROL SYSTEM
ENGINE ANTI-ICE SYSTEM
PITOT/ANGLE-OF-ATTACK PROBE HEATER SYSTEM
UP FRONT CONTROL
IFF TRANSPONDER (APX-IOO(V))
TACTICAL NAVIGATION SET (ARN-118 (V)
)
ELECTRONIC ALTIMETER (APN-194 (V)
)
MISSION COMPUTERS (AYK-14) (NOTE 8)
Assign alpha character (Z) of the EOC code when the following
system(s)/condition(s) prevent the aircraft from being safely
flyable. The aircraft is not capable of day, field flight
operations under VMC with two-way radio communication and
necessary aircraft and crew safety provisions. The aircraft is










LIGHTING SYSTEMS (ANTI-COLLISION LIGHT)
(2 MINIMUM)
HYDRAULIC/PNEUMATIC SYSTEM




(WUC 51 SERIES) (NOTE 9)
FLIGHT REFERENCE (NOTE 10)
INTEGRATED GUIDANCE AND FLIGHT CONTROL
MAINTENANCE SIGNAL DATA RECORDER SET





WEAPON CONTROL (HEAD-UP DISPLAY,
MULTI-PURPOSE DISPLAY GROUP) (NOTE 12)



















1. WHEN THE EQUIPMENT IS INSTALLED, REPORT ON THE COMPLETE
SYSTEM. IF THE EQUIPMENT IS NOT INSTALLED, REPORT ON THE
WIRING AND PLUMBING ONLY.
2. EQUIPMENT INSTALLED OR BLANK-OFF AS REQUIRED FOR SAFELY
FLYABLE AIRCRAFT.
3. ONLY REQUIRED FOR SPECIAL WEAPONS CAPABILITY.
4. ALL AIR-TO-AIR, ACM, AND AIR-TO-GROUND MODES.
5. REQUIRED WHEN CARRYING HARM WEAPONS.
6. DATA LINK/RADAR BEACON SET OR ILS REQUIRED FOR ADVERSE
WEATHER CARRIER LANDINGS, BUT NOT BOTH. RADAR BEACON SET
IS REQUIRED FOR FULLY AUTOMATIC CARRIER LANDINGS (MODE 1)
.
7. ONLY REQUIRED TO BE CODED (L) IF LESS THAN TWO (2) POSITION
LIGHTS AND THREE (3) FORMATION LIGHTS ARE OPERABLE ON EACH
SIDE OF AIRCRAFT.
8. BOTH REQUIRED FOR MISSIONS A, B, C, D, J AND K; NUMBER ONE
MISSION COMPUTER REQUIRED FOR MISSION L.
9. INCLUDES: PRESSURE ALTIMETER (BOTH STANDBY AND RESET MODES),
AIRSPEED INDICATOR, ATTITUDE REFERENCE INDICATOR, VERTICAL
SPEED INDICATOR.
10. INCLUDES: AIR DATA COMPUTER EQUIPMENT, MAGNETIC AZIMUTH
DETECTOR.
11. BOTH RADIO SETS REQUIRED FOR MISSIONS A, B, C AND D; ONLY
ONE OF TWO RADIO SETS IS REQUIRED TO BE OPERATIONAL FOR
MISSIONS J, K AND L.
12. HUD, LEFT AND RIGHT DDI , KI REQUIRED FOR MISSIONS A, B, C
AND D. HUD AND LEFT DDI REQUIRED FOR MISSIONS J, K AND L.
13. ALL ELECTROMAGNETIC INTERFERENCE (EMI) PROTECTION DEVICES






Copy of the Visual Identification Display
System/Maintenance Action Form (VIDS/MAF) , showing
the placement of Equipment Operation Capability codes
and part numbers (NSN's) on the form.
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LOCAL USE ACCUMULATED WORK HOURS
NAME/SHIFT TOO. BO« DATE MAN HOURS ELAPSEO MA
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NAVSUP LETTER ON VARYING SMA BY IMEC
Commander, Naval Supply Systems Command letter, Item
Essentiality Coding of Secondary Items , 4400 Serial
042E/KWL, dated 20 March, 1985 with enclosures,
requesting approval from the Chief of Naval
Operations (CNO) to implement an essentiality
weighted inventory levels-setting model by varying
System Material Availability (SMA) goals with respect
to IMEC category.
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From: Commander, Naval Supply Systems Command
To: Chief of Naval Operations (OP-41)
Via: Chief of Material (Code 01FF)
Subj: ITEM ESSENTIALITY CODING OF SECONDARY ITEMS
Ref: (a) NAVMATINST 4423.8
(b) OPNAVINST 4441. 12B
Encl: (1) OASD (MRA&L) Memorandum for the Assistant Secretary of the Navy
(S&L) of 15 Oct 1981
(2) COMNAVSUPSYSCOM 042E of 22 Feb 1985
(3) Recommended Policy of Varying System Material Availability Goals
by Essentiality Category
1. The purpose of this letter is to request
material availability (SMA) goals by item es
year 1987 execution at SPCC and ASO. Enclos
mission essentiality code (IMEC) rules. To
applications (i.e., Modified Fleet Logistics
(MODFLSIP) COSAL and, in accordance with ref
establish numeric stockage objectives at the
enclosure (1) requested that the Navy provid
Management Policy, OASD (MRA&L) with a detai
prior to initiation of implementation of act
permission to vary system
sentiality category for fiscal
ure (1) approved Navy's item
date, these codes have had limited
Support Improvement Program
erence (a), criteria for which to
wholesale level). Additionally,
e the Director, Supply
led implementation milestone plan
ions.
2. It is the policy of this Command to use IMECs at all echelons of
support. Based upon this policy, the following actions have been taken:
(a) SPCC and ASO have completed the assignment of IMECs to their inventories,
(b) analysis is currently underway evaluating the use of IMECs in both the
range and depth decisions at the intermediate level, and a future POM
initiative will address this issue, (c) the new AVCAL inventory model allows
for IMECs in the safety level calculation, (d) a memorandum of agreement (enclosure
(2)) has been signed by DLA and NAVSUP which provides for the transmission of
IMECs, and (e) for Navy managed material, wholesale level POM initiatives
have been submitted to establish higher SMA goals for the IMEC categories
commencing in fiscal year 1987.
3. Enclosure (3) summariz
implementation of IMECs at
were evaluated. However,
category was selected base
relative ease of computer
The analysis was conducted
System (CARES) analyzer fo
completed the IMEC coding
(3) has not been completed
analysis will be provided
The SMA goals were chosen
the CARES analyzer.
es the results of the analy
the wholesale level. Seve
the alternative of varying
d upon both the ease of und
program modifications neces
using the Computation and
r SPCC managed items. Sine
process, a detailed analysi
for ASO managed material,
for information purposes at
based upon the cost effect!
sis evaluating the
ral alternative methods




e ASO has only recently
s similar to enclosure










Enclosure (3) displays a scenario of changing the mix of safety level
toward the higher IMEC items, thereby improving readiness. The reference (b)
SMA percent goal of 85 percent is maintained for the lowest essentiality
category. However, SMA goals are enhanced for the items that are primary
contributors toward readiness. It should be noted that this recommendation
is consistent with both the NAVSUP/DLA policy of enclosure (2) and the
guidance of the OASD Supply Management Policy Group (SMPG)
.
5. Sufficient funding has been requested to implement the above policy.
Therefore it is recommended that this policy be approved for implementation
at both ASO and SPCC as an initial effort toward improved sparing to readiness
objectives at the wholesale level.
J. B. WH!7 ,\.;£R
Assistant Co-rander





Superintendent NPGS (Codes 55RH, 54MG)
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ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
WASHINGTON. DC. 20)01
MANFOWcR.
reserve afta.rs QCT , - ]%]
AND LOGISTICS
MEMORANDUM FOR THE ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF THE NAVY (S&L)
SUBJECT: Item Essentiality Coding of Secondary Items
This is in response to the memorandun from the- Director, Materiel Division,
DCNO(Logistics) , dated 28 July, subject as above, which requested approval
of the Navy's proposed item essentiality coding rules and the recommended
changes to DoD Instruction 4140.42, "Determination of Initial Requirements
for Secondary Item Spare and Repair Parts."
I want to commend you and your staff for taking the initiative to develop
what cppears to be a logical and viable essentiality coding system. As
you are aware, the DoD Stockage Policy Analysis Report of August 1980 and
recent reports published by the General Accounting Office have recommended
that all DoD Components develop an essentiality coding system and that item
essentiality become a i-.sjor consideration in the management of secondary
items. Your efforts to date are considered responsive to the recommendation
contained in these Reports and provide a logical basis for necessary future
actions.
As a result of our review, the Navy's proposed item essentiality coding rules
are approved and authorization is granted for the Navy to proceed with plans
to implement the essentiality function as provided for in DoD Instructions
4140.39, "Procurement Cycles and Safety Levels of Supply for Secondary Items,"
and 4140.45, "Standard Stockage Policy for Consumable Secondary Items at the
Intermediate and Consumer Levels' of Inventory." We are concerned, however,
that the Navy's implementation of unique essentiality coding rules, together
with similar actions by the other Services, may have a long-range detrimental
impact on the capability of DoD activities to communicate essentiality in-
formation to assigned Integrated Materiel Managers. In this regard, it is
requested that the Navy coordinate appropriate interface procedures applicable
to Integrated Materiel Managers with this Office. Further, the Navy should
provide the Director, Supply Management Policy, 0ASD(MRA&L) with a detailed
implementation milestone plan prior to initiation of implementation actions.
While we understand the thrust of your initiative to revise DoD Instruction
4140.42, we do not agree with the necessity for making the requested changes.
This Instruction currently recognizes essentiality in the initial spares
Enclosure (1)
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computation and allows stockage of essential items even if they do not quali-
fy for stockage through the use of the cost differential tables. Recent
changes being staffed to both DoD Directive 4140.40, ,:Basic Objectives and
Policies on Provisioning of End Items of Materiel," and DoD Instruction
4140.42 and the increased use of optimization models to spare to an opera-
tional availability will undoubtedly lead to the stocking of greater range
and depth of essential items by the Navy.
R. D. VJebster
Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense





From: Commander, Naval Supply Systems Command
To: Commanding Officer, Navy Aviation Supply Office go rr „
Commanding Officer, Navy Ships Parts Control Center ° ISBS
Subj: TRANSMISSION OF NAVY ESSENTIALITY CODES TO THE DEFENSE LOGISTICS
AGENCY (DLA)
Encl: (1) Memorandum of Agreement Between the Defense Logistics Agency and
the Naval Supply Systems Command
1. For the last several years, Navy and DLA have been negotiating both the
method of transmitting Item Mission Essentiality Codes (IMECs) to DLA for
Navy applicable items managed by DLA, and the DLA Inventory management plan
which would utilize the IMECs. With the completion of IMEC coding at both
ASO and SPCC, the need for a final agreement became essential.
2. Enclosure (I) Is an approved Memorandum of Agreement (MOA) between DLA
and Navy resulting from recent negotiations. In summary, the MOA requires
the transmittal of IMECs via the Weapons System Item Data Cards (WSI Cards).
DLA will vary performance goals by IMEC category (I.e., the more essential
Items will have the higher System Material Availability (SMA) goals). The
lowest performance goal will be ninety percent SMA.
3. It is requested that ASO and SPCC Implement the procedures of enclosure
(1) in coordination with DLA at the earliest feasible date, and that
















Memorandum of Agreement Between the Defense Logistics Agency
and the Naval Supply Systems Command
BACKGROUND : The Navy's two Inventory Control Points, Navy Ships Parts
Control Center (SPCC) and the Aviation Supply Office (ASO) , are In the
process of completing the assignment of essentiality codes to Items for which
they are the program support Inventory Control Point. The essentiality codes,
referred to as IMECs (Item Mission Essentiality Codes), combine consideration
of the Importance of the equipment to the mission of the ship/aircraft with
the importance of the Item to the equipment. These codes range from one
(least essential item) to four (most essential item), with IMEC five
designated for safety items. This OSD approved methodology will allow Navy
to manage its inventories to achieve improved Fleet readiness by varying
performance goals by essentiality code, vice the use of the current fill rate
goals applied across the entire inventory. To date, the essentiality codes
have been used to increase range and depth of secondary items on shipboard
allowances. Consistent with the above is the requirement to transmit the Navy
essentiality codes to DLA for DLA managed items applicable to Navy weapon
systems.
OBJECTIVE : Improve Fleet readiness by enhancing wholesale inventory levels
for items that are the most essential to weapon system operational
availability.
METHOD OF OBTAINING OBJECTIVE : NAVSUP will transmit to DLA essentiality
codes for all items in support of Navy weapon systems. Upon receipt of Navy
essentiality codes, DLA will stratify Navy items Into management levels to
allow enhanced inventory levels for Navy's most essential items.
PROCEDURES : The following procedures apply:
a. ASO and SPCC will transmit Weapon System Item Data Cards (WSI Cards)
to DLA for each Navy weapon system related item.
1. The WSI cards will contain the Navy LMEC codes (1,2,3,4, or 5).
2. The WSI cards will contain a weapon system code.
(a) ASO will submit the two position Weapon System Designator
Code (WSDs).
(b) SPCC will submit a two position Local Routing Code (LRC)
,
not to conflict with ASO's WSDs.
b. DLA will accept the Navy IMECs and Incorporate them into the DLA





1. IHEC l* and 5 corresponds to Management Level I
2. IHEC 3 corresponds to Management Level II
3. IMEC 1 and 2 corresponds to Management Level III
U, Non-weapon system designated Items correspond to normal
DLA support •
c. Enclosure (1) portrays DLA's Inventory Management Plan.
d. Items returned/transferred back from DLA to Navy management will
contain the assigned Navy IMEC.
TIMING : This Memorandum Of Agreement Is effective upon signing by both DLA
and NAVSUP. The actual transmittal of IMECs from Navy to DLA will commence
1 January 1985 at the Navy Ships Parts Control Center and 1 February 1985 at
the Navy Aviation Supply Office.
<T0\ D. M. Babt












MANAGEMENT LEVELS IMEC INVENTORY LEVELS STOCKACE POLICY
I U, 5 Highest Enhanced Stock all Items which qualify
for stockage based upon either:
,
A. Pa9t Actual Demands
B. Predictive Demands
C. Military Service has
indicated no anticipated demand
but failure of Item could cause








































































TOTAL 88 32 $27
* Change from current execution policy; dollars in millions.
** Response time statistics (availability delay) do not take into account




CNO LETTER APPROVING VARYING SMA BY IMEC
Chief of Naval Operations letter, Item Essentiality
Coding of Secondary Items
,
4400 Serial 412E/5U394066,
dated 3 June, 1985, approving the request from the
Naval Supply Systems Command (NAVSUP) to implement an
essentiality weighted inventory levels-setting model
by varying System Material Availability (SMA) goals
with respect to IMEC category.
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From: Chief of Naval Operations
To: Commander, Naval Supply Systems Command
Subj ITEM ESSENTIALITY CODING OF SECONDARY ITEMS
Ref: (a) NAVSUP ltr 4400 042E/kwl of 20 Mar 85 (NOTAL)
(b) OPNAVINST 4441. 12B
1. Reference (a) requested approval for flexibility to vary
Supply Material Availability (SMA) goals by essentiality
category at SPCC and ASO.
2. The poLicy of increased safety levels for weapons critical
spare parts requested reference (a) is approved when funded.
Funding is considered available when the lowest essentiality
items are protected at levels that meet OPNAV availability
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APPENDIX I
SPCC'S 1990 POM SUBMISSION
Abstract of SPCC's 1990 Program Operations Memorandum
(POM) Spare Parts Initiative budget submission,
attempting to identify the additional funding
required to implement the current essentiality




POM 90 SPCC IMEC SPARE PARTS INITIATIVE
ABSTRACT
The Item Mission Essentiality Code (IMEC) program is the Navy's plan to
relate the essentiality of parts to equipments and eauipments to Fleet
missions. By targeting increased material availability and reduced system
response time for mission essential material, IMEC attempts to maximize the
determinants in the Operational Availability equation. The program, as
discussed herein, integrates the range, depth and repair requirement
recessary to enhance support to both demand and nondemand based items. Since
the inventory has been segmented into essentiality categories, significant
flexibility exists in funding and executing the individual elements of the
programs. Each initiative's range, depth and repair is costed out by
essentiality level, benefits identified and execution plan described. Each
initiative stands on its own merit and may be executed individually or as an
integrated part of the total IMEC program.
Ill FNn.osnpF n *
4400
0412/JRB
NAVY SHIPS PARTS CONTROL CENTER
POM 90 SPCC LMEC SPARE PARTS INITIATIVE
Ref: (a) CNO ltr 4400 412G/5U394258 of 17 Jun 85
(b) OASD (MRA&L) Memorandum for the Assistant Secretary of the Navy (S&L)
of Oct 81
(c) NAVSUP ltr 4400 042E/KWL of 20 Mar 85
(d) CNO ltr 4400 412E/5U394066 of 3 Jun 85
Encl: (1) IMEC Program Benefit Analysis
(2) IMEC Program Cost Analysis
(3) SPC IMEC 4 Weapon Systems and Equipments
1. Purpose. The purpose of this initiative is to identify funding necessary
to implement the Navy's Item Mission Essentiality Coding (IMEC) program for
material with high mission essentiality at SPCC. The funding requested is an
inventory augmentation for wholesale system stock replenishment, to increase
both the range and depth of material with potential primary mission impact.
The initiative is forwarded pursuant to reference (a)
.
2. Background. The IMEC program is the Navy's plan to relate the
essentiality of parts to the equipment- in which they are installed,- and in
turn, the criticality of that equipment to the execution of Fleet
primary/secondary missions. The product of this relationship is the IMEC. By
stratifying the ICP inventory into IMEC categories, a method is* provided
whereby items with relatively higher essentiality can be designated for
increased range and depth protection. This additional protection directly
translates into increased material availability and reduced requisition
response time for the Fleet key "readiness drivers." By targeting increased
material availability and reduced system response time for mission essential
material, IMEC attempts to maximize the logistic support determinants in the
operational availability equation.
In 1981, OSD approved the Navy's item essentiality coding concept by
reference (b) . During the ensuring period (1981-1983), SPCC embarked on a
major effort to complete IMEC coding for 1H, 7G and 7H Cog material. The
inventory was stratified by essentiality and IMEC codes registered on the MDF
on a line item basis. Alternative IMEC execution schemes were developed,
analyzed and evaluated from 1982-1985 and a plan was agreed upon and forwarded
by NAVSUP to 0P-41 by reference (c) for approval. The plan significantly
increases the SMA goals for high IMEC material (IMEC 4 92 percent and IMEC 3
90 percent) while concurrently dramatically reducing availability delay time.
The plan further calls for maintaining the current support goal of 85 percent
for nonmission essential material (IMEC 1) as directed by OPNAV. The plan was
approved by reference (d) in June 1985 pending availability of required
funding.
3. Benefits Analysis Summary. Enclosure (1) provides a detailed analysis of
the benefits associated with the IMEC program. In summary, the benefits
2 ENCLOSURE (1)
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include a significant increase in the supply availability goal for IMEC 3 & A
(90 percent/92 percent) mission essential material, a dramatic decrease in
availability delay and increased range protection for the Fleet for nondemand
based essential material.
In summary, it is estimated that $98M will be required to fund and execute
the IMEC A initiative over the five-year POM budget base with execution
commencing in FY90. The IMEC 3 initiative will require $138M with execution
beginning in FT91. Program sponsors should be aware that substantial
flexibility exists in actual program execution and funding since the IMEC
coding scheme allows SPCC to target specific program elements individually or
"in total." This approach provides a vehicle to adjust the program support
and direction to the future funding climate and readiness objectives.
In developing the cost projections individual weapons systems support
requirements were aggregated at either the IMEC A or IMEC 3 level. Current
UICP file structures do not provide downward visibility to individual weapon
system level cost component. However, it is anticipated that such capability
will exist through the advent of advanced data base management software in the
time period of planned program execution; thus, allowing for the consideration
of specific weapon system priority in executing the IMEC program. In
recognition of the present limitations, enclosure (3) was developed to
provide an overview of those primary mission (IMEC A) weapon systems and
equipments that will receive the initial" enhanced support of the IMEC program
in FT90.
A. Cost Analysis Overview. Enclosure (2) provides a detailed cost analysis
for implementing IMEC at the wholesale level for items coded IMEC 3 and A
(primary mission impact). Costs are identified for enhanced levels, required
range increase and increased repair of DLRs. These costs are further broken
out by IMEC category, funding year, one time costs and program maintenance
costs.
5. Conclusion. For over fifteen years, SPCC has investigated methods to
relate inventory support strategy to Fleet operational availability. We
recognize the need to move from the classical demand based to a weapon system
availability based inventory management scenario. We believe the plan
presented here provides such a capability and warrants serious consideration
and positive support at all levels. The capability exists today to make this




1. Increased Supply Material Availability for Critical Material
PROJECTED* CURRENT SMA
IMEC SMA TARGET INC
4 92% 85% 7%
3 901 857 5%
2 87% 85% 2%
1 85% 85% 0%
*Note:
IMEC 4
Increasing supply material availability to 92 percent for IMEC 4
material should result in filling an additional 3,700 IMEC 4 requisitions per
year or 18,500 over the five-year (FT90-94) budget base. Each of these
requisitions are for material identified as essential to equipments whose
failure could result in the loss of a primary mission capability within the
Fleet.
IMEC 3
Likewise, by increasing supply material availability for IMEC 3
material to 90 percent should result in the filling of an additional 5,300
requisitions per year or 21,200 over Che four-year readiness budget base.
Each of these requisitions are for material identified as essential to
equipments whose failure could result in the degradation of a primary mission
capability within the Fleet.
2. Decreased Availability Del,ay* for "Readiness Drivers":
Projected Avai!lability Delay* (Days)
1H COG 7G COG 7H COG
Curr Proj % Curr Proj % Curr Proj %
IMEC ADD ADD DECR ADD ADD DECR ADD ADD DECR
4 13 7 46% 64 13 79% 70 21 70%
3 16 13 18% 53 23 56% 77 29 62%
*N0TE: Response Time statistics (availability delay) do not take into account
transportation time, issue times, or receipt take-up times. However, they do
reflect a direct reduction in Mean Requisition Response Time (MRRT) associated
with ICP delay for readiness related material requirements, i.e., material
identified as potential C3/C4 CASREP.
ENCLOSURE (l)
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3. Additional Range Protection for Mission Essential Material.
Stocking to readiness requirements, implies that item essentiality vice
demand be the primary criteria for determining inventory range. At SPCC, all
items which carry an IMEC 3 or 4 (potential C3/C4 CASREP) and which would not
otherwise qualify for stockage based on demand are considered for readiness
protection levels based on our Numeric Stockage Objective (NSO) program. This
POM paper identifies a previously unfunded and unexecuted NSO readiness net
requirement of $45M. Commencing in FY90 for IMEC 4 items and FY91 for IMEC 3
items, basic minimal (1 MRU) coverage is programmed for this essential
material. By time phasing these range adds over the two fiscal years in
priority sequence, all requirements can be procured with minimal disruption to
the procurement pipeline. Historically, SPCC has been limited in both funding
and inventory authority to procure NSO coverage only an items which have
already experienced a CASREP/cannibalization. Our plan as presented here is
proactive in that protection is provided to prevent the C3/C4 CASREPs for items
where demand forecasting techniques have proven to be both ineffective and
Inappropriate.
4. Increased Repair of IMEC 3/4 DLRs.
The benefits of increased availability (paragraph 1) and decreased supply
response time (paragraph 2) imply that repair output of DLRs must also
increase to ensure sufficient RFI assets exist to support these new goals. A
one-time increase in depot level repair dollar requirements of $15M is
projected as an integral component to the levels (depth) enhancement
initiative for IMEC 3/4 repairable assets-
5. Summary of Benefits:
We believe the IMEC program as described provides a well-organized and
effective approach to increasing operational availability by increasing the
availability and decreasing supply response time for mission essential
material. To gain full benefits, the program integrates the range, depth and
repair initiatives to provide a total approach for upgrading support to both
demand and nondemand based items while balancing the procurement and repair
decision process.
Since the inventory has been segmented into essentiality categories,
significant flexibility exists in funding and executing the individual
elements of the program. Each initiative's range, depth and repair is costed
out by essentiality level, benefits identified and execution plan described.
Each initiative stands on its own merit and may be executed individually or as





1. Readiness Levels (Depth) Requirements: (41,,000 Line Items)
FY




















































- NSO Reason Code "G" Potential C3 CASREP Applies







4. POM Summary IMEC 3 Readiness Support Reqm'ts:
FY
90 91 92 93 94







1) DEPTH 79 7.9 7.9 7.9 102.7
2) RANGE 18.4 1.8 1.8 1.8 23.8
9.0 .9 .9 .9 11.7
106.4 10.6 10.6 10.6 $138. 2M
Proposed plan for IMEC 3 identifies the specific and integrated costs of
additional Depth, Range and Repair Budget requirements. Funding and execution
of the IMEC 3 readiness initiative would occur in FY91 with maintenance costs
(est at 107 of the FY91 base) for inventory/essentiality "churn" programmed in
FY92-94. All requirements in net millions (?) as reflected ir change from
current execution policy after adjustment for asset application factors (DLA





1. Readiness Levels (Depth) Requirements:
FY
(16,,000 Line Items)






























































- NSO Reason Code "G" Potential CA CASREP Applies






A. POM Summary IMEC A Readiness Support Reqm'ts:
FY
90 91 92 93 9A
a. INV AUG
1) DEPTH A9 A. A. A. A.
9
2) RANGE 15 1.5 1.5 1.5 1.5













Proposed plan for IMEC A identifies the specific and integrated costs of
additional Depth, Range and Repair Budget requirements. Funding and execution
of the IMEC A readiness initiative would occur in FY90 with maintenance costs
(est at 10% of the FY90 base) for inventory/essentiality "churn" programmed in
FY90-94. All requirements in net millions ($) as reflected in change from
current execution policy after adjustment for asset application factors (DLA =




SPCC IMEC "4" WEAPON SYSTEMS AND EQUIPMENTS
Air Supply Systems, Combustion
Air Supply Systems, Main Propulsion
Air Compressed Systems
Aircraft Launching Accessories
Alarm Safety & Warning Systems
AM-3007/URT Amplifier
AMMO Handling Equipment
AN/BQR2 Sonar Listening Set




















AN/URC-32 H. F. Transceiver
AN/URC-4 Radio Set
AN/USQ-36 Data Terminal Set
AN/UYK-7 Computer Set
AN/UYK-24 Data Processing Set
AN/WQC-2 Sonar Coma Set
AN /WOC-5 Sonar Coma Set





















Bilge & Ballast Sys. Submarine
Bundle Tubes, Distilling Plant








Ejection Unit, Main Air
Electric Power Dist Systems
Engine, Recip Main Propulsion
Exhaust System
Fuel Oil Filling System
Fuel Oil Service System
Gas Turbine Generator Set
Generator Sets 60 &/600 HZ
Gland Exhauster Group






Main Condensate & Feed System
Main Reduction Gear
MK11 Fire Control Switch Board
MK198 GYro Compass
MK111 ASROC Fire Control
MK11A ASROC Fire Control
MK116 Shipboard Fire Control
MK118 Tartar Computer
MK12 Missile Launch SW Box
MK13 Steam Catapult
MK5/6 Fresnel Lens
MK6 Train Parallax Controller
MK60 XMTR Relay
MK61 Indicator Train
MK74 Guided Missile FCS
MK75 Range & Bear IND,











MK31 ASW FCS Switchboard
MK32 Torpedo Tube, XMTR,
UB FCS & Switchboard
MK329 Weapon Control Panel
MK33 UB Fire Control Switchboard
MK330 Missile Setting Panel
MK331 Torpedo Setting Panel
MK332 Weapon Status Panel
MK333 Bridge Display Panel
MK338 Remote IND Unit Panel
MK339 Local Control Panel
MK34 21" BOW Submerged Torpedo Tube
MK34 UB Fire Control Switchboard
MK35 Radar Equipment
MK37 GFCS XMTR & AMP
MK337 Control Interface Panel
MK338 Gun Control Panel
MK38 ASROC ATTACK Console
MK4 Console, Timer
MK44 Relay XMTR












- Main Lube Oil
- "FT" Marine Jet
Regulators, Line Voltage
SB/441 Radar Dist S.B."
Search & Track Radar "CG4"
Shell Plating
Ships Order & Indicating Systems
Shore Power FAC for "AD"
Sonar Liquid Cooling System "DDG"
SS-2 Radar Set "SS"
~
Starting Systems Helicopter "DD931"
Steam Generators, Super Chargers
Steering & Ships Control System
Submarine Steering & Diving System
20MM Gun Group "CG4"
Fleet Ballistic Missile Weapon System
AM-7114 Power Supply
Strategic Weapon Systems
TRIDENT/Poseidon MCC 4 Systems
Trident Standard Information Display Console!





Oxygen Gen Plant CV/CVN
Piping & ACC:
- Fuel Oil Service
- Main Lube Oil






- SSN Main Stream
- BLR Blower System

















- Motor Gen Control







Transfer Group "MSC CLASS"
Transmission "MSC & PG CLASS"
TRIM & Drain System For:
- AD, FFG, SS, SSN
TSEC System For ARS
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